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Report OD the causes of, aDd circumstances attending, the 
accident which occurred at Creswell Colliery, Derbyshire, OD 
the 26th September, 1950. 
The Right Honourable Geoffrey Lloyd, M .P .. 
,Ali"ister of Fuel and POll'er. 
24th April, 1952. 
StR. 
/.-INTRODUcrOR Y 
10 compliance with lhe direction of your predecessor, I have held a Formal 
lnvestigation under the provisions of Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911. 
and under the Ministry of Fuel and Power Act, 1945, into the causes of, and 
circumstances attending, the accident which occurred at Crcswell Colliery, 
Derbyshire, on 26th September, 1950. resulting in the loss of 80 lives. 
The accident was due to a disastrous fire which started at a transfer point of 
the trunk belt conveyor system in the South·\Veslcrn Main lmake Haulage 
Road in the High Hazel seam. Because of tbe intensity and extent of the fire 
and of the inability to get it und6r control, it was found necessary to seal off the 
part of the mine in which the fire was located in order to extinguisb the fire by 
depriving it  of air. Not until the district was reopened about one year later. were 
investigators able to study fully the origin and extent of the fire and the probable 
course of events inbye where the victims had been at work, and so the Inquiry 
had to be held in two stages. 
I opened the I nquiry at the Miners' I nstitute, Creswell, on the 17th October, 
1950, and, after hearing evidence from 26 witnesses about conditions and 
happenings up to the time when the fire was sealed off. 1 adjourned the I nquiry 
two days later. I t  was resumed on the 27th November, 1951, when eight new 
witnesses were called and four of the previous witnesses were re·examined. 
The Inquiry concluded on the following day. 
The appearances at the Inquiry were as follows:-
(a) Ministry of Fuel alld Power 
Mr. W. B. Brown, H.M. Divisonallnspector of Mines 
Mr. W. Widdas, H . M .  Senior District Inspector of Mine:) 
Mr. W. Whitehouse, H.M. District Inspector of Mines 
(b) National Coal Board 
Mr. W. L. Miron, O.B.E. 
Mr. W. H. Sansom, M.C., Production Director 
Mr. W. V. Sheppard, Area General Manager, No. I Area 
Mr. J. Brass, Area Production Manager, No. t Area 
(e) National Union of Mineworkers 
Mr. S. Watson, CB.E., and Mr. E. lanes, C.B.E. 
(d) Noltil1ghwn Area of National U"ioll of Mineworkers 
AId. W. Bayliss, C.B.E. , and Mr. Bernard Hazelby 
(e) National Association of Colliery Managers 
Professor I. C. F. Statham and Mr. W. Sharpe 
(f) British Association of Colliery Management 
Mr. G. P. Thompson 
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(g) National Assoc;allOIl of Colliery Ol·ermen. Depuries alld Shot Firen 
Mr. B. Walsh, Mr. R. Walker and Mr. George Cooper 
(It) Assodarion of Alining Electrical and Afedwllical Engineers 
Mr. T. 11. Williams 
(i) Safel), in J\fmes Research Establishment. J\flllislrJ of Fuel and Pmrer 
Mr. A.  I-I .  A. Wynn and Dr. W. C. F. Shepherd 
(j) Bolsol'er Colliery Company Limited. alld The Midlaud Counties Colliery 
OUllers' Association 
Mr. F. H. lessop 
A list of the persons killed is given in Appendix I. and a list of the 33 witnesses 
examined during the course of the Inquiry is given in Appendix 11. 
H.-PARTICULARS OF THE COLLIERY AND ITS 
BACKGROUND 
(a) General 
Crc�well Colliery. formerly owned by the Bolsover oilier) Compan) 
Limited. was taken o\er by the National Coal Board In 1947. It is  included In 
the No. 4 Sub·Area of No. I Area of the East Midlands Division, and is situated 
In Derbyshire ncar the 'ottlOghamshlre border and lies about six Imles south­
west of Worksop. 
Thc mine \Vas under the dad) supervision of Mr. G.  In\emrity \\ho. after a 
spell as a spare manager under the Bo!sO\cr Colliery Company. \"'a� appointed 
manager of Crcswell Colliery in No\ember. 1946. Mr. G. S. \V Pay ton. after 
a period as Safcty Omcer. was appointed undermanager In January. 1948. 
To assi�1 them they had six overmen, a safely officer. a traming otlicer and a 
number or deputies and shot firers. Above the manager was an Agent, Mr. J.  A. 
Tankard. who, in turn. came under the dIrection of the ub·Area manager for 
No. 4 Sub·Area of No. I Area, Mr.  W. E. S. Peach. The o. I Area Production 
Man3ger was Mr. J.  Brass. the Area General Manager was Mr. W. V. Shcppard, 
and Mr. W. 11. Sansom was the Divisional Production Director. All of these 
higher officials rrom the undermanager upwards hold rirst·Class Certificates 
or Competency under the Coal M ines Act. 1911. 
The mine has 1\\0 circular shafts. each 18 feet m diameter and completed 111 
1896, \\hich \\ere sunl to work the Top Hard seam at a depth of 444! }ards. 
The '''gh Hazel seam \\3S Intersected by the shafts at 329 yards from the 
\urface. In 1939. ror e\plorarory reasons. the upcast (or No. 2) shaft was sunl 
to the Low Mam seam at a depth of 736 yards. A cross-measure drift wa!o. then 
driven from the Top Hard seam to the Low Main seam and a connection wa:, 
made with 0.2 shaft. In 1933 a cross-measure drift \\as driven at I m 3 from 
the Top Hard up to the I-IIgh Ha7el seam to enable f'lces In this Se31ll to be 
opened out. Output from the High Hazel seam was gradually increased to 
replace the declll11ng output from the Top Hard seam. \Vork ceased in the 
Top Hard III 1941, and, thereafter. all the output came from the High Hale!. 
'\0 that at the lime of the accident an extensive area of this seam had been 
worked ouL. 
The 1-lIgh Ilazel seam has an 3verage inclination of I i n  30. is about 
4 fcel 6 inches thick, and was worked by advancing longwall methods 111 three 
mam producing districts, kno\\ n a� the North-West. South· East and Soulh· \Vest 
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Districts. There were 1.14-t men employed underground and 355 on the surface. 
During the three months prior to the fire, the \\<eekly output of the colliery 
\\J.� just over 14.000 tons, about half of which came from the South-West 
DI�trict. The coal from all three districts was transported to the pit bottom b) 
trunk-bell conveyors and wound 31 the do\\ ncast shaft. Coal filling and winding 
were done on the day and aflernoon shifts. Repair and majntcnancc work was 
done on all three �hift�. but mostly 011 the night-shift. The general sequence of 
\'ork on the coal faces \\as: cut, fill, pack and turnover. 
SIIlCC the Soulh-\Ve�1 District \\3S the district directl) concerned \\ith the 
hre. It is the anI) one about \\hich details need be given. 
(b) Hethod of !l'orkiug 
The general lay·oul of this district IS shown In Plan No. I. There were two 
main roads serving the district, the Main I make. which was used for the transport 
of coal in trunk-belt con\'cyor:,. and the MalO Return. which was used for the 
transport of men by an endless-rope haulage man-Tiding set. These lwo malO 
roads were 60 yards apart for I � mile!! from the pit boltom and 34 yards apart 
for the remaming It miles. A little more than half-\\ay mbye, a downthro\\ 
fault-known as the Elmton Fault-was encountered. Originally, the Soulh­
West District \\3S laid out to work coal only as far as Ihis fault, bUl in 1945. It 
was decided to work coal beyond this fault. Consequently, In that year, 1\\0 
dip drifts, the intake dipping I 111 9 and the return dipPlIlg at I In 6, were driven 
through the fault. which at this point is in the form of a trough. the first throw 
being downwards with 195 feet displacement. followed by an upthrow of 85 feel. 
makmg: a total downthrow displacement of 110 feel. 
Apart from 57's headlOg. which was winning out a ne\\ face not far inbye 
from the shafts, there were five double-unit faces in the diMrict. Of thel:te. 
'\10. 59's-the only onc on the outb)c side of the Elmton Fault \Va!:! a double­
unit face, 295 yards long, where the seam was undercut by machine to a depth 
of 4 feet 6 inches in a dirt-band one foot above the floor. The coal was shot down 
by explosives and hand-filled on to conveyors. It was regarded as a stand bye­
face and was only worked as required. 
Beyond the Elmton Fault there were four working faces and an abandoned 
face, o. 63's. which had been slopped when it reached an unprmed fault at a 
distance of 840 yards 10 the right, off the main intake. �Iaterials had been 
drawn off from this panel except for the supports in the right-side gate and the 
central-loading gate. The four working faces were known as the 74's, 64·s. 
68's and 65's respecti'vely. Particulars of these faces are as follows :-
The 74's face was 167 yards long and formed the development panl::1 for the 
area. Four gateways were formed in this development to provide two intake 
and two return airways. The working face was 2� miles from the pit bottom. 
No. 64's was a double-unit face, 300 yards long. which had advanced 1,000 
yards to the left off the main intake. The 68's face was 450 yards long but only 
two-thirds of its length was in production. This part of the face had advanced 
410 yards to the left off the main intake. whilst the remaining one-third of the 
face, which had been stopped, had advanced 450 yards. No. 65's was a double­
unit face, 330 yards long, which had advanced 300 yards to the left off the main 
intake. 
With the exception of No. 68's, the working faces were machine cut at Hoor 
level to a depth of 4 feet 6 inches, the coal being shot down and hand-filled on to 
race conveyors. The production part of 68's face was worked by a Meco-Moore 
cutter-loader which took off coal to a depth of 3 feet 3 inches along the face and 
loaded it on to a face conveyor. Coal from the face conveyors in all faces was 
transported by gate conveyors to the main trunk conveyor system on the South-
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West District main-intak.e road. Steel props and bars were used throughout on 
these faces and the three-props-per bar system was in general use. The normal 
thickness of seam on these faces was 4 feet, but from 5 10 6 inches of top coal 
was len up to form the immediate roof. 
Prior to 1948, under-tub endless-rope haulage had been III use for transporting 
coal to the pit bottom along the main haulage road but in July, 1948, a complete 
change-over was made to trunk-belt conveying to a central loadlllg POlllt 
90 yards from the pit bottom. The belts were of 7-ply construction with rubber 
facings. At the lime of the accidentlhis main trunk-conveyor system comprised 
three conveyors in tandem: No. I belt, from the No. I transfer point near the 
pit bottom to Ihe No. 2 transfer point, a distance of 1,703 yards: No. 2 belt, 
from the No. 2 transfer to No. 3 transfer point, a distance of 1,080 yards; and 
No. 3 belt, from No. 3 transfer for a distance of 1,060 yards to the point where 
the gate-belt comeyor from 74's face delivered its coal. With the exception of 
the coal from 59's face which was delivered on to the No. I belt at a point 69 
yards olltbye the No. 2 transfer point, the coal from all other faces was fed on 
to the No. 3 belt. These three main bells were each 36 inches wide and were 
each driven by 100 h.p. SutcJirTe Goliath Units. Tbe belt speed wa� about 
350 feel per minute. Each transfer point was covered III by a sheet metal canop) 
and water sprays were fitted for dust suppression. The roadway throughout was 
of ample cross-section and an endless-rope haulage was Installed along onc 
side of the conveyors for the transport of supplies. On the outbye side of the 
Elmton Fault, the roadway was supported by steel arches, camber girders and 
slraight girders, but on the inbye side of the fault, steel arches were used as 
standard practice. 
The complement of work.men in the South-West DISITlCI on the three shifts 
was: day-shirt, 93: anerooon-shift, 163; and night-shift, 122. On the night­
shift of the 25th/26th September, however, because of transference of workmen 
from the South-East District, 133 persons were employed in the South-\Vesl 
District. 
(c) VelJlilalioll 
The general direction of the ventilation, the air splits and the quantltle� 
passing at various points as recorded in the air-measurement book for the 
month of August, 1950, are shown in Plan No. 1. 
About 60,000 cubic feet of air per minute entered the main South-Wesl 
intake and trunk-conveyor road. Approximately one mile inbye, a split was 
taken off to ventilate 59's panel, leaving 44,000 cubic feel of air per minute to 
pass on down the intake drift through the Elmton Fault. Thereafter, other 
splits were taken off 10 ventilate, on the left side, 64's and 68's panels, and on 
the right side, 65's. The remainder of Ihe air went forward to ventilate 74's 
development face. All faces were on unit ventilation. Safety lamps were u�ed 
throughout. 
(d) Fire-Fighting Arrangements 
The measures, both in men and materials, for fighting fires on the surface or 
in the underground workings werc well organized and, as will be seen from 
Plan No. I ,  the facilities provided in the South�\Vest District appeared to be 
ample to cope with any emergency. Fire-fighting water ranges were laid along 
the main-intake airways from the shafts to points near each working face. 
Hydrants were installed at intervals of approximately 250 yards and, in addition, 
at points such as gear-heads, junctions and transfer points. The pipes were 
usually 2 inches diameter, but a start had been made to replace those in the 
North�West District with pipes of 21 inches diameter. Recent additions to the 
ranges in the South�\Vest District were all this size, but preparations were also 
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In progress la renew the Soulh·West pipe range from the shafts with 3 Inches­
diameter pipes. Water was supplied from the 5 inches rising-main in the down­
cast shall which served 3S the pump range from the Top Hard seam. The pump 
in this seam was Tun only during the night-shift and arrangements were therefore 
made to feed water into the main from surface tanks during the day and after­
noon shifts. In addition, another 1 inch dIameter pipe was also used to supply 
water via the upcast shaft into the fire-fighting mains. This supply was kept 
running continuously and was generally sufficient to feed all the dust suppression 
waler sprays. Reducing valves were fitted at each shaft bottom to regulate the 
pressure in the mains. 
Fire stations were arranged at points along the main road. Plan No. I shows 
the standard equipment at each station. lanual force pumps were not kept at 
each fire stalion but one could q uickly be transported from the shaft bottom. 
The equipment was examined and reported on monthly. Rules were laid down 
for the organization and conduct of fire·fighting work and fire drills were carried 
out regularly. The water pressure at the shaft bottom was between 400 and 
430 lb. per square inch. Flow tests were made periodically and the last test made 
in June, 1950, at 59's hydrant gave a Ho" of 45 gallons per minute at a Dow 
pressure of 20 lb. per square inch. 
(e) Afan·riding Trains 
Arrangements were made for the mechanical transport of men to and from 
their work in the South·\Vesl District. These consisted of two man-riding 
trains operated in the main·return airway by an under-tub endless· rope reversible 
haulage, known locally as the" Paddy." The two trains were attached to the 
rope-one at the out bye end of the haulage and the other at the inbye end-so 
that when the haulage was running one train travelled inbye whjle the other 
travelled outbye. A three·rail track was used with a length of double track at 
the" meetings," situated between 400 and 500 yards out bye from the top of 
the Elmton Drift. 
If) Telephones 
Telephones were installed at the following places to serve the South· West 
District:  
( I)  59's junction, serving No. 2 transfer point and 59's face, which was 
330 yards distant. 
(2) No. 3 transfer point. 
(3) 64's loader gate junction. 
(4) Main road near 65's loader gate. serving 65's face which was 350 yards 
distant. 
(5) 68's junction, serving 68's face which was 360 yards distant. 
(6) 74's transfer point at lhe end of the main-trunk conveyor system, 
serving 74's face which was 425 yards distant. 
(7) 64's tandem in the loader gate, serving 64's face which was 410 yards 
distant. 
(8) P�sbye or .. meetings" on the man�hauJage in the main�return 
airway. 
(9) Inbye terminus of man-haulage in the main·return airway. 
(10) Foot of Elmton Drift, main·return airway. 
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The mam underground telephone system wa� controlled from a switchboard 
111 an office situated In the main-return airway near the bouom of the upcast 
shaft. One attendant \\3S employed at this switchboard on each shift on which 
I>crsons were employed underground. On the day and afternoon shifts. the two 
coal-drawing shifts, there was usually a number of persons working within 
�peaking distance of the telephone exchange, so that if the attendant received 
a telephone message \"hich had to be given to someone near the pit bottom or 
which required some aCllon 111 the vicinity, such as the tnppll1g of a near-b) 
electric switch, the attendant could call to someone to dell\er the message or 
take the necessary action, without hil1l::.elf leaving hiS office. Ir, on the other 
hand, any such message \\:1S received on the night-shift, the attendant would 
normally have to leave his switchboard ror a �hort time to delivcr or act upon 
thc message, because few persons worked \\uhin speaking distance of the 
exchange on this shift. This was a matter of little importance 111 ordinary circum­
\tances but, :\\ will be seen. 11 was of importance on the morning of the fire. 
III.-THE FIRE 
All parties agreed that the fire started at the No. :2 transfer point about 
3.45 a.m. on the 26th September, 1950. \\hen 232 persons were underground, 
of\\hom 133 \\ere employed In the South-\Vest District beyond the scene of the 
fire. Shortly before the firc started, hO\I,.ever. two workmen had left the district, 
thus leaving 131 persons inbye at the lime. Of these, 51 persons escaped by way 
of the return :.Iirway. The remaining 80 pe(sons \\-ere caught by the fumes and 
lost their Ih'es. They were later certified as ha \ II1g died from carbon monoxide 
. . 
pOlsomng. 
During the da)-shlft of the 25th September. It was obscncd that o. 2 
trunk belt wa� scored. At the beginning of the afternoon-shift that day. 
J. R. Hindley, a belt-mal11tCnanCe man. was called to examinc It. He found a 
groove, about 6 lIlches from the belt edge on the supplies track Side, extending 
along the belt for a distance of nearly 300 yards. In no place was the belt cut 
through but for a short length the groove had penetrated about two-thirds of 
the thickne�� of the bell. Along with others. HlIldley examlncd the conveyor 
throughout it\ length but nothing was found that would account for the grooving. 
The conveyor was started up and Hlndley inspected it at intervals during the 
.,hift. His last inspecllon of the belt was made at 8.30 p.m. A full shift of coal 
had been transportcd without mishap and arrangements were made for Hindley 
to slay overtime to repair the belt. Thc�e arrangements \\ere cancelled. however, 
because 11. Godfrcy, ihc o \erman in charge of the district on the night-shift, 
finding that a length of coal on No. 65's face had not been filled ofT. gave 
IIlstructions for the belt to continue running until the coal \\as cleared. 
When .101). Morris, the No. 3 transfer point attendant, arrJ\'ed at his place of 
work at the �tarl of the night-shift about I1 p.m., he examined the No. 2 belt and 
estimated Ihat the grooving extended for upwards of 200 yards and that for a 
length of 6 10 8 yards the belt was cut through. He said he was able to push 
hiS hand through the slit. The condition of the belt had clearly worsened since 
Hindley had made his inspection at 8.30 p.m. evertheless. the belt was started 
up and nothing untoward was obsened until 3.10 a.m. when Morris signalled 
10 W. H. J-lird, the attendant who was stationed at the telephone 70 yards on 
the oUlbye side of No. 2 transfer point. to SlOp the No. 2 bell. Hird did so and 
Morris then telephoned Bird via the pit-bottom exchange and told him that the 
belt was torn and had a "trailing cnd." He arranged 10 travel out bye while 
Hird travelled Iflbye so that the)' could find where the damage to the belt had 
started. Morris set off and when about 400 yards from No. 2 tran.sfer point he 
encountered smoke, and when still ISO yards away he saw fire at the transrer 
chute and names between the chute and the sidewall of the roadway. 
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Bird traveUed inbye no further than the 70 yards to the No. 2 transfer point 
where he saw the transfer hopper full of torn belting, looking, as he said, as 
" if three or four men each side ... had been laying it out." He returned to 
his telephone, informed the man In charge of the pit-bottom telephone exchange 
what had occurred and asked to be put in contact with Godfrey, the night 
overman in charge of the South-West District. During this time the No. 1 
belt continued to run although Hird stated that he had signalled for it to stop. 
A few minutes later Hird saw fire in the chute at the transfer point and agam 
telephoned to the pit bottom to ask for the electric power to be cut off and for 
help to be summoned. He had just completed this telephone caU when Jos. 
Morris arrived and asked him if he knew the transfer point was on fire. Hird 
said he did and looked at his \\atch. It was then 3.45 a.m. From the time 
No. 2 belt was stopp.:d until the fire was discovered, Morris had travelled 
nearly 1,000 yards, includjng 350 yards up a drift nSlDg at I in 9, examining the 
com'eyor structure and belt on the way. Hird, although the first lO see the fire, 
made no effort to deal with it. Morris, on the other hand, as soon as he arrived, 
asked about the portable fire-extinguishers. There were two at the nearby 59's 
Junction. He applied the first with little effect, and the second failed to function. 
The fire-station was on the inbye side of the I o. 2 transfer point and soon 
became inaccessible because of the fire. When the station was first established 
It conformed to rhe normal and good practice at this colliery, in that it was sited 
on the intake side of the vulnerable point, because it then served the old 59's 
junction which was 260 yards Inbye from it. Even if the fire-station had been 
on the outbye side of the transfer point. it is doubtful whether 111 the circum­
stances of this fire-it would have altered the cour.,e of events Before the actual 
fire was discovered by Hlrd and Morris, the strip� of torn belling within the 
metal enclosure of the chute were, in my view. so well alight and so relatively 
lOaccessible, that portable fire extinguishers or bud.cls of sand or water would 
have been of little use. And with the knowledge we now have from the experi­
mental fire al the Buxton Research Station, the burning of the torn belting would 
develop so rapidly and fiercely that nothing short of a copious W2.ter supply 
at adequate pre sure would have met the situation. Nevcrlheless, when the 
position of machinery or material with a potential fire risk is moved, the site 
of the fire-fighting equipment should be moved to meet the new conditions, 
otherwise the equipment loses much of its potential value. 
Immediately on receipt of Hird's telephone message about the fire, F. Kir�. 
the pit-bottom telephone-exchange attendant. sent telephone warning of the 
fire into the South-West District and calls for fire-fighting teams from other 
parts of the mine. The manager and undermanager were also informed. It 
was now 4 a.m. Messages were then sent for the Central Rescue Brigades at 
Chesterfield, senior local officials of the National Coal Board, H.M. Inspectors 
of Mines and officials of the mine-workers' Unions. \Vhen the undermanager 
got to the pit, he spoke to the manager at his home by telephone, and then went 
underground. Having received assurances that the inbye workmen had been 
warned of lhe fire and were on their way outbye, he went straight to the scene 
of the fire. There he found that some members of the pit fire-fighting teams, 
led by J. Rodda, overman in charge of the North-West District, had been in 
action since shortly after 4 a.m. They had travelled in the" Paddy" in the return 
airway, laking with them a supply of fire-hoses and nozzles. The fire-fighters at 
once coupled up their hoses to the water main but got little more than a trickle of 
water which was quite ineffective. The now of water was so small that their 
efforts with the hoses were described at the Inquiry as" just like standing in a 
garden watering flowers." The water supply at normal quantity and pressure 
had unexpectedly and, for the time being at least, unaccountably failed. Repeated 
telephone messages for an increased supply brought no improvement. As soon 
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as [be undenn,tni.tger arrived he also telephoned Instructions for the �ource of 
the trouble to be fully investigated \\ithout delay. It was now about 5.15 3.m. 
In the meantllne, supplies of portable fire·extinguishers, sand and stone dust 
were collected and sent to the scene of the fire and used very effectively. So 
much so, indeed, that tbe impression was gained that tbe main fire had been 
got under control, with the result that a message was sent to the surface that 
the fire was nearly c'{tinguished. Unhappily, this was not the case. The steam 
and smoke in the road\\i.ly had reduced the visibility 10 practically nil and had 
masked the spread of the fire along the roadway, an extension which, no doubt, 
had been accelerated when we burning No. 2 belt-still under tension-broke 
and tbe burning end sprang inbye. 
At 5.20 a.m. a team of trained rescue bngadc men from Cheslcrfield Rescue 
Station arrived at tbe flre. But because of the lack of an adequate supply of 
water under pressurl.!, they were unable to do any really effective fire-figbting 
work. While the other fire·fighters continued their efforts with the portable 
fire-extinguishers and the little water still available, the rescue brigade men 
donned their liquid·air apparatus and tried to get past and ahead of lhe fire in 
an 3t1empl to prevent it frolll spreading further inbye. But the heat was too 
intense and the attempt failed. 
The lack of an adequate water supply under pressure was later found to be 
due to a set of most unfortunate coincidences. As previously indicated, the 
underground fire mains were supplied constantly \\ itb water by a I·inch pipe 
from the o. 2 upeas! shaft, but this quantity was only sufficient 10 maintain 
the dust-suppression sprays. For the much larger quantity of water needed 
for fire·fighting. reliance was placed on the 5 JOches diameter rising main in 
No. I shaft. During the night-shift, this main was continuously fed with waler 
from the Top Hard pump but during the other two shifts tbe water supply was 
fed into the main from surface tanks through suitable valves. The routine 
control for the change of water supply to the shaft maiD was well established 
under normal conditions. Unfortunately, for the first time for many years, tbe 
Top Hard pump failed to start at the commencement of the rught-�hift of the 
25thl26th September. 1950, and the fitters who examined it considered tbat it 
could not be repaired during the shift. Although the pump· man informed 
H. Godfrey, the night overman, of the breakdown, neither the pump-man nor 
the fillers Ihought it necessary to inform any surface official and so nothing was 
done to adjust the surface valves to ensure that the main was fed with waler 
from the surface tanks. 
Thus it happened that whcn the fire hose wal> coupled to the firc·mam near 
the scat of the fire-which was about onc mile inbye and 175 feel above the 
shaft bottom level-the water supply was almost negligible, partly because 
little or no water was entering the shaft rismg-main and partly because of the 
pressure absorbed in overcoming the static head and pipe friction. This 
waler-supply system had been provided at considerable cost in time and 
materials and was considerably above the standard found in many collieries 
today. Its failure at a critical time-indeed the only time it had e\er been 
required to deal with an underground fire-proved disastrous and costly. 
This experience demonstrates the need for a careful review of the fire-fighting 
water supply at collierie to ensure that an adequate supply of water at sufficient 
pressure is constantly available at all points in the fire·fighting water mains. 
For this purpose, the fire mains should be of adequate sile and should be 
supplied from a source feeding directly and continuously into them. Tests 
should be made at sUllable intervals to check the quantity and pressure of 
water available, and the pressure of the water supply at any transfer point 
should be measured at the beginning of each working shift. A conveyor 
should not run if the supply of water is inadequate. 
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The water posltton \\'.b not rectilicd until a considerable lime after the 
arriv'al of the colltery engineer about 5.10 a.m.; but by the ttme a reasonable 
.!.upply of waler W,lS available, the fire in the chute at o. 2 transfer point had 
burned itself out, and the fire had spread a long way inbye. \Valer was still 
necessary , however, to cool down the hot material and smouldering wood. 
\not her attempt was made to reach the advancing fire by working forward 
along the road\\'a), but because of damage to roof supports, the effect of heat 
and water on the strata and the deterioration of roof and sides, conditions 
became LOO dangerous to aUow the auempts to continue. Later, temporary 
supports were set in the hope of reaching the advancing fire, but only 60 yards 
of roadway were recovered when, for reasons given later, the erection of the 
seals became essential and slOpped all further fire-fighting and recovery work. 
While all this had been going on, several men from the inbye working:, in 
the South-West District had come out safely by way of the main-return airway. 
And then, about 5 a.m., another inbye workman, J. \V. Turner. who had 
been worJ..jng on 65's face, came out of 59's loadcr gate. lie had travelled 
by the main return to 59's right-hand return, over the overcast on the main 
IOtake and then along 59's right side face. On his way he had opened the door:, 
at the overcast and saw the fire raging underneath ir. He was in a distressed 
condition and reported that there were more men behind him. The firc had 
thus travelled at least 125 yards inbye in about I � hours. 
It was now realized that the II1bye men were not getting oul as expected 
and rescue teams were at once sent in to explore the main return. They found 
one body about 500 yards inbyc from 59's lerr return gale and brought it to 
the fresh-air base. Artificial respiration was tried but there was no response. 
Eventually. the rescue teams brought out two other bodies and reported that 
they had seen ten more. 
By this time the smoke in the main return at 59's left side return gate was 
extremely dense and had a very bad effect upon the eyes of the rescue men. 
"loreover, the effect of the smoke-laden air on the canary ctlrried by the rescue 
teams showed that the atmosphere WJS so deadly that it was impmsible to 
conceive of anyone being alive in the inbye worklng�. It was decided that. 
except for an exploration of the main return tow.lfds the shafl, rescue work 
should be stopped for the time being. The return airway was explored towards the 
:,haft bottom but the rescue team reached the stable slit without finding anyone. 
A conference of representatives of the National Coal 13oard, the workmen':, 
Unions and the Inspectorate was now called 10 discuss the position and decide 
future action. It came to the unanimous conclusion that, SlOce no onc could 
be alive on the inbye side of the fire and since the dangerous condition of the 
roadway precluded fire·fighters from reaching the fire-front to prevent the fire 
from spreading further inbye. the only pOSSible way of extinguishing the fire 
and of avoiding the risk of a firedamp explosion, was to seal off the districl. 
The sites of the seals were agreed and arrangements made for improvmg the 
haulage facilities to transport the necessary buliding materials inbye. During 
this period the rescue teams were having a well·earned rest. 
An examination of the main return at the stable slit indicated that the smoke 
was now much less dense than formerly and that the effect on the eyes wa'i 
less severe. It seemed as if the intensity of the fire had somehow become 
suddenly reduced. A further examination was then made of the scene of 
the fire and of the main return at 59's lefl gate. The outbye cnd of tbe fire 
area had considerably cooled down but because of the dangerous condition 
of the roadway the advance of the fire inbye along the belt road could not be 
ascertained. A second examination revealed that the smoke in the return 
was definitely less dense. Discussion took place as to the possibility of 
recovering the ten bodies that had been previously located by rescue men, and 
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it y,JS unanimously agreed that this should be done. More bodies were found 
just beyond the point where the ten bodies were lying, and, altogether, 47 
were recovered. There \Vas no worsening of the condition of the atmosphere 
III the return airway and It \ as possible to send in more rescue teams to explore 
the lnbye slits connecting intake and return. In each case the rescue men 
reponed that they \ ere unable to travel these slits because of heat, smoke, 
and deterioration of roof conditions. This information not only made it 
inadvisable to send rescue parties further away from the fresh-air base but 
also emphasized the need to build the seals as quickly as possible. By this 
lime the out bye haulage arrangements were functioning properly, and sand­
bags and supplies \ ere ready to come inbye in quantity. In addition to 
recovering the 47 bodies. the rescue men located 27 others. leaving Sl� more 
10 be round. 
IV. EALING-OFF AND SUBSEQUENT RECOVERY 
OPERATIONS 
The site chosen for the two initial seals was a short distance IIlbye the stable 
slit and fully 1,000 yards from the pit-bolLom. The sloppings were built with 
.5.1nd-bags. The intake stopping was 8 yards long and the return stoppmg. 
which had to be built under diffieuh and \ery trying conditions by men wearing 
self-contained breathing apparatus, was 7 yards long. Each stopping \ -as 
fitted with a 2 inches diameter steel sampling tube and a 10 inches diameter 
steel ventilation pipe. During the bUilding of each stopping. a tunnel, 3 f •. el 
square, was formed to maintain ventilation as long as possible. At one period 
during the building of the stopping in the return airway the rescue teams were 
man-bandling sand-bag!) at the rate of 800 per hour. Two teams worked in 
the return, each for two-hour spells, but the work was so arranged that one 
learn was being relieved every hour. The fresh Incoming team carried tht: 
sand-bags to the sile while the team previously IransporllOg material for an 
hour, spent the second hour in actual building of the stopping. Sufficient 
sand-bags were taken close to the stoppings before commencing 10 fill in the 
.. tunnels ". ThiS operation was timed to take place simultaneously in both 
!)tOpplOgS. Similarly, "hen the tunnels were tilled, the final sealmg was 
completed simultaneously by bolting plates on the ends of the 10 inches 
diameter steel pipes. During these sealing operations. only the minimum 
number of men required to do the work and supervise it were permiltcd 
underground. After sealing, all persons were withdrawn from the mine and 
no one was allowed underground for 48 hours. Two days later. a careful 
IOspecllOn of the seals showed that they were in good order, and stc.ps were 
taken to ensure that the air pressures 00 both stoppmgs were reasonably 
balanced. The out bye ends of the slOppings were then strengrhened by the 
erection of brick walls, 3 feet thick. 
Thereafter, systematic sampling of the atmosphere behind the stopplOg!) 
was carried out continuously. In time. the results of analyses of samples 
indicated that all combustion within the sealed-on" area had ceased. A 
meeting of all the interested parties was held on 18th December. 1950. when 
It was decided to set up a panel of experts to plan a scheme for reopening the 
district and have u ready so that work could begin during the Easter holidays. 
commencing the :!:2nd March, 1951. It was thought that this would allo\\ 
ample time for the strata to cool and also minimize any tendency 10 a recru­
descence of the fire wben the ventilation was restored. The plan was duly 
prepared and was submitted to and approved by another meeting of repr�senta­
tives of all the interested parties held on 23rd February, 1951. With the 
coming of the Easter holidays. the work of reopening began. 
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Rescue teams were used for broaching both seals, for preliminary exploration 
and for the erection of temporary sloppings at selected points so that the 
noxious and inflammable gases could be removed in stages. I t  was realized 
that methane would bulk very largely i n  these gases. Careful control of the 
quantity of air passing into the affected area limited the final methane content 
of the atmosphere in the upcast shaft and kept it below the lower limjl of 
inflammability. As a further precaution, however, the fan evasee was extended 
to a height of 70 feet, so as to minimize risk of ignition on the surface and the 
possibility of recirculation of gas-laden air through Lhe downcast !'haft. 
Operations proceeded according to plan until the district was cleared as 
far as the bottom of the Elmton Faull drifts, but the quantity of air available 
here was very severely restricted by an extensive heavy fall  on the conveyor 
road between 59's timber slit and the compressor slit at the top of the Elmton 
Drift. Unfortunately, at this time, there was also a sudden drop i n  the 
barometric pressure which liberated gas from the inbye panels and, because 
of the restriction due to falls in the conveyor road, the available ventilation 
was unable to cope with the new conditions. 1n these circumstances, it  was 
decided to seal off the dislrict once again, but before doing so, 27 bodies were 
recovered and two more located. This time the seals were built in both road· 
ways at the top of the Elmton Drirts. 
During the exploration of the road ways, it was established that the fire 
had extended from No. 2 transfer point to the outbye side of the compressor 
slit-a distance of 610 yards. The position of tbe new seals, therefore, allowed 
for a full inspection of all the fire area and enabled the conveyor road to be 
repaired so that futl ventilation would be available for the final clearing of the 
working panels. This was effected on 10th August, 1951,  and the remaining 
six bodies were recovered. 
I n  aU these operations, as i n  the caTtier work, the rescue teams drawn from 
a wide area did a fine job, working with diligence and courage, ilnd performing 
hard and hazardous tasks without any untoward incident. It  is noteworth) 
that some teams traveUed as much as 1,500 yards away from the fresh·air base, 
thus making a total journey of 3,000 yards, 
The work of the Area Scientific Department of the National Coal Board 
In relation to air sampling and analysis during the rescue and recovery opera­
tions is worthy of record. The staff dealt with more than 1 ,000 samples. To 
begin with the analyses were made in the laboratory at Bolsover, some miles 
away. When for a period it was found desirable to take samples at intervals 
of 1 5  minutes throughout the day and night, it was decided to convert a room 
at the Creswell offices into a temporary laboratory. This arrangement proved 
highly satisfactory when the district was being sealed off, and especially during 
the building of the stopping in the main-return airway. As the tunnel in this 
stopping began to function, the flame·safety lamp tests made by the rescue 
men beg:lO to indicate increasing percentages of firedamp in the air, and at 
one time as high as 3 per cent. This was disturbing in an area where there 
was known to be an open fire in the vicinity. Laboratory analyses of samples 
never showed more than 0.5 to 0.6 per cent., and there is no doubt that the 
large number of samples taken and the early report of the results of analyses 
from the laboratory did much to create a feeling of confidence in the men in 
the danger zone. It would appear that the dust mised by the high-velocity 
air passing through the tunnel in the stopping had the effect of elongating the 
gas·cap of the flame·safety lamp. 
By their systematic sampling and analysis and their interpretation of tbe 
results of analyses, the scientific staff greatly helped those in charge of under­
ground operations nol only to determine when to reopen the district but also 
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how much air to circulate to ensure that, when the mbye workings were bemg 
cleared of innammable and noxious gases. these gases "ere diluted to harmless 
proportions. 
\'. EXA�[I 'ATION OF HIE FIRE AREA 
As soon as condilions allowed, a careful and detailed exammation wu::, made 
of the area covered by actual fire. The No. I belt was burnt through. The 
burnt end of the top belt was found 48 feet from the out bye end of the 
centralizing hopper where it had apparently continued to burn or smoulder 
until it was extinguished at a set of idler rollers. The burnt end of the botLom 
bell wa., found underneath the chute structure of the No. 2 transfer point 
about 5 feet from the outbye end of the hopper. The coal-carrying side of 
this boltOI11 belt was burnt i n  several places for a distance of 7 feet from the 
burnt end and part of the rubber cover was stripped for a distance of nearl} 
95 feel from that cnd. \Vhen the two burnt ends were brought together on 
the »urface they did not match. Nevertheless. although some part of this belt 
had been consumed b} the fire. there seems lillle doubt that most, if  not all. 
of the distance between the burnt ends could be accounted for by the Oy-back 
when the belt burnt through whilst under tension. 
The casing of the chute and centralizing hopper .,ho\\ed signs of heatmg. 
as all the paint was burned on' except for a little at the out bye end of tbe 
centralizing hopper and underneath the sloping-chute plate. The roof and 
sides over most of the chute-unit were supported with steel girders resting on 
wooden-end props, with wooden lagging. The props, though charred on the 
surface i n  places, had continued to give adequate support to the roof. but the 
lagging had burnt and charred remains were found. Two pieces of charred 
lagging were found rcsting on idler rollers. The pOSSibility that this 'vood, 
heated by friction agalllst (he rollers, might have started the fire, was con­
sidered, but was ruled out because. among other reasons, i t  seemed certam 
that the wood had fallen out of posillon after the fire had started. 
Up to Slightly above the level of the No. 2 belt delivery roller, and sloping 
do.wnwards out bye, the chute was found ruled with debris which extended 
down between the idler and impact rollers of the No. I belt below. All of 
this material was carefully collected, sent to the surface and weighed, and 
then dispatched to the Safety i n  Mines Research Slat ion at Buxton for sic\-mg 
and a more detailed examination. It was found to comprise : stone-dust and 
powdered-charred belting (passing through : inch mesh), 2.010 lb. ; lump� 
of stone, 464 Ih . .  un burnt and partly hurnt belting. 254 lb. ; charred-wood 
lagging. 35 lb. , old nuts and bolt", I lb. 13 07 : and white metal from idler 
rollers, lOt lb. 
\Vhen most of thi� material had been remo\-ed from the chute, i t  wa::, �t:cn 
that, bet\I,.een the top edge of the sloping-chute plate and the No. 2 belt deli\er} 
roller, a quantity 01 torn belting was very tightly wedged and looked as if H 
had been pulled in by the moving No. 2 belt. The chute plate was dropped 
and the wedged pieces of torn belting more closely examined. The surface!; 
In contact \\ ith the remains of the o. :! belt and, at the !;ide. i n  contact with 
the metal surface of the delivery roller, \\ ere found to be worn by friction. 
The piece of o. 2 belt still remaining i n  contact with the delivery roller, and 
conforming to its curvature, was unburnt. It \\as fuIJ width and not grooved, 
but the rubber surface was severely worn and showed an imprint of the trapped 
belting. 
After the chute and the piece of No. 2 belt still adhering to the delivery pulley 
"'ere removed, the pulley itself was rotllted and found to be undamaged. There 
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\\ J.s plenty of grease ID the top of each beanng which had nOl been hot enough 
to melt the grease. An examination of the surface of the pulley showed no 
mdication of slip between belt and pulley. 
Altogether, 43 pieces of bell longer than 8 inches \vere recovered from the 
chute debris. Of these pieces, len, varying in length from 12 inches to 54 
inches, showed a cut through onc surface rubber and through all seven plies 
of canvas, but in no case was the cut through the la�t layer of rubber. The 
cut was consistently 5� inches from onc edge of the belting. Fifteen of the 
other pieces were 5t inches ""ide. On the o. I conveyor. with its out bye 
end torn, another piece of belling 43 fecl 8 inches long. was found. 
This evidence suggested the possibility. mdeed the probability, of a fire 
having started at the top of the chute plate by frictional heating between the 
wedged torn belling and either the No. 2 delivery roller or the No. 2 belt, as 
It passed round the roller. 
The top of the chute plate wa� found to be bo\\cd down\Vard� with a 
maximum deflection of 5! inches about 1 5  inches from the left side looking 
inbye. When the chute was disconnected it was found that. at the point of 
maximum deflection, there was a gap of I i inches between the chute and the 
2 inches by � inch iron strip by which the belt wiper was fastened to the chute. 
The wiper was found to be worn away until it was level with the edge of the 
chute. which was about I k inch from the face of the No. 2 belt delivery roller. 
One of the eight bolts. by which the iron strip had originally been fixed, was 
found to be missing at the gap. Pieces of torn belting in this gap had pushed 
the belt wiper away from the edge of the chute and had also bent the strip of 
iron between the second and fourth bolts from the left-hand side. \Vhether 
this missing bolt and gap had been of long standing or were the result of the 
happenings immediately before or during the fire, can only be a matter of 
conjecture. In any case, I do not consider they had any material effect on the 
course of events. 
A heap of stone was found on the floor near the delivery cnd of No. 2 bell. 
This suggested that there had been at some time a .. pile-up " III the chute due 
to No. I belt being at rest while No. 2 bell was delivering stone. All the belt 
rollers and their beaTIngs of both os. I and 2 conveyors in the vicinity of the 
No. 2 transfer point \\ere examined in great detail. Several were found to 
be damaged, usually by the melting out of the end alloy discs containing the 
ball bearings. but this damage was considered to be the result of the fire. In 
no case was there any suggestion that healing at a roller beaTIng was a probable 
or even a possible cause of the fire. Nor was there anything to suggest thrH 
either the tensioning gear of the No. I belt, or the driving gear of the o. 2 
belt bad aOYlhing to do \.\-ith the start of the fire. On this gear-head were 
found two small pieces of belting, neither of which sho\\'cd the signs that would 
have been expected if lhe fire had started at the gear-head by the friction of a 
jammed belt. On the noor, just inbye of the chute, was a heap of coarse coal 
dust which had taken no part in the fire. It was covered by a white deposit 
which appeared to be the remains of the charge of a foam eXI1 Il.guisher. 
Except for odd pieces of charred belt, and one picce of the top belt, 9 inche:o 
by 4 inches, which was found under a stone presumably carried by the top 
belt, the No. 2 conveyor belt was completely missing for a distance of morc 
than 30 yards on the inbye side of its deJ.ivery head pulley. I I  was at this poin[ 
that falls of ground began to be encountered. These falls had to be cleared 
10 permit exploration and assist ventilation. A few pieces of unburnt belt 
were found underneath the falls. At a wet place a piece, 39 inches long, had 
presumably been protected by a pool of water. Some steel arch girders had 
become so hot that they had twisted under load. The loader gate of old 59's 
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district showed signs of heating for a distance of 60 feet but the fire bad not 
travelled down it. Near tbe Timber Stit, two pieces of top belt. about 8 feet 
long. were found, having apparently been protected by small falls. At a 
point 500 reet rrom the Timber Slit two larger pieces or top belt. 16! reet and 
2 1  feet long, separated by a distance of 9 feet. were reco\-ered. This was at 
the site of a large fall of roof and it  seems Ijkel) that here the fire received a 
check and propagated only along the bottom belt which would be protected 
by the com'eyor structure forming a tunnel through the fall. I t  was probably 
this " lull " which made most of the early recovery work possible just prior 
to the erection of the first stoppings to seal off the dlstricl. The fire did 
ho\\cver, pass this obstacle and there i s  no doubt that had the seals not been 
erected al the time they were, the fire would have spread much farther than it  
ultimately did. A short distance be},ond this point and near the top of the 
• drift through the Elmton Fault. the burnt ends of No. 2 belt were found. The 
end of the bottom belt was found undemeath a fall of roof and the end of the 
top belt about 50 feet farther inbyc. From this poim signs of heating decreased 
down the drift and finally died away near the roof. 
From its burnt cnd, the top belt was found to be practically undamaged for 
a di"'tance of 257 yard� lIlbye. For the next length of about l OO  yards to the 
"lo. 3 trJ.mfer point and then back along the bottom belt out bye to its burnt 
cnd-a total length of -t69 yards-the belt was found to be torn or cut. Damage 
to the top belt started with t hree .• sloughings .. or .. gougings .. and a hole 
8 inches long and ! inch WIde, about 5! inches from the edge of the belt 
trJvelling road �ide. From the edge of this hole-3nd at the same distance 
from I he edge of the belt-the belt was cut through for the whole of the distance 
to the No. 3 transfer pOint, with the strip of cut belt lying on the conveyor 
rollers alongside the remaining pan of the belt. For a distance of 20 yards 
from the starling pOInt, the edges of the cut showed o.:casional .. sloughings .
, 
while other ., sloughings " were seen on the 5 !  inches wide strip. The cut 
was clean except that the rubber on the non-coal-carrying side had a generally 
jagged appearance. At distances of 8 and 10 Y<lfds from the start, the rubber 
011 the under-side of the bell was joined across the cut for ,I length of t inch. 
This cut strip of belting terminated underne3th the chute of No. 3 transfer 
point, and one end of the 43 feet long strip-found (as already mentioned) 
on the No. I cOIl"cyor outbye the No. 2 transfer point-matched perfectly 
with an cnd of the stnp found at the No. 3 transfer poinl. 
A strip of the belt was found to be missing for the whole length of tbe 
bottom belt from the No. 3 transfer pomt out to the burnt cnd at the top of 
the drift. For the first 204 yards, a 5+ inches wide strip was missing, leaving 
on the remaining belt a clean strJight edge, having all the appearance of being 
cut by some sharp object, except that the rubber on the non-coal-carrying side 
was jagged. The width of the miSSing piece then ::.uddenly increased for a 
short distance, IIldicaling that cross-tearing had occurred. From subsequent 
observations, i t  seems extremely likely that it  was at thi::. pOint, I.e. when fully 
200 yards of torn strip had collected in the chute while the No. 2 belt was still 
running, that the loose beltjarnmed i n  tbe No. 2 chute. For the next 100 yards, 
the width of the remaining belt varied and the edge was jagged, with the strip 
of belt missing v3rying from 7 to 9 inches. I t  was from this length that the 
grooved pieces of belting recovered from the No. 2 chute must bave come, 
as nowhere else was the missing piece wide enough. This gave a clue to the 
condition of tbe belt immediately before the fire occurred and indicated that 
there had been a cut through all seven plies of canvas but not through the 
bottom rubber. 
For the next 50 y.uds near the top of the drift, the remaining belt showed 
a clean cut edge, with a 5i inches wide strip missing. Then followed about 
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. 70 yards of jagged edge belting wllh a strip, I !  inches lo 4t inches wide, mlsslOg. 
This portion of the belt did not show any indication of being grooved. A 
straight cut edge re-appeared on the last 10 yards of the belt before the burnt 
end, except for a 1 2  Inches length about I fOOL from the end. 
At this point, the belt bad apparently torn out to the edge, and there is no 
rcason to suppose that i t  was other than full width from bere outbye to tbe 
delivery roUer at the No. 2 transfer point. Indeed, we ba\"c the evidence of 
Jas. Morris, tbat. from a point just outbye the top of the drift. the bottom belt 
was the fuU width to the No. 2 transfer point. 
From the calculated area of missing belt, it was estimated that there must 
have been about 1,600 lb. of torn belting in the No. 2 chute at the time of the 
fire and that of this quantity. 1,350 lb. was burnt. 
V).-CAUSE OF CUT BELT 
As already mentioned1 the cause of the grooving and subsequent cutling of 
the belt had not been ascertained from the examinations made before the 
occurrence of the fire. Nor did the investigations underground after the fire 
reveal the cause. Experiments were therefore made to see if It was possible 
to determine the probable cause. The gear-head of the No. 2 conveyor was 
re-erected on the surface to operate a short length of conveyor. It was known 
that the No. 2 belt transported stone from rippings and that, among this stone, 
pieces of ironstone were occasionally found. Pieces of shale and pieces of 
Ironstone. both from the Soulh-\Vest District, were held firmly and fed to the 
bell as it passed over the delivery roller. It  was found that pieces of shale 
cut into the belt but soon splintered after several yards of belt had passed. 
As the shale was fed in, a cutting edge developed that was capable of cutting 
through two plies of canvas for a distance of Little more than 50 feel. The 
chances of a piece of shale cUtling evenly through 500 or 600 yards of belt to 
a depth of seven plies of canvas seemed very remole. When a piece of iron­
stone, however. was used, a cut of precisely even depth for a length of 200 
feet-the limit of belt available i n  the experiment-was obtained. A shorter 
cut, but also to the limit of the length of belt available, was also obtained to a 
depth of six plies of canvas and part way into the seventh. After cutting, the 
ironstone was just perceptibly warm to the lOuch and, apart from being 
blackened by rubber, was practically unworn. IL seemed evident that a piece 
of ironstone suitably wedged would be capable of continuing indefinitely to 
cut a belt to an even depth. It  is important to note that although a belt was 
readily cut i n  th.is way, the appearance of the cut-even in broad daylight­
gave no clue as to its depth. The belt had to be suitably flexed lO determine 
lhe depth of cut. 
From these experiments, a reasonable explanation of the damage and cutting 
of the No. 2 belt as found after the fire would appear 10 be as follows. A 
piece of ironstone had settled at the top of the No. 2 chute probably due to 
a pile-up of stone when the No. I belt stopped wrule the No. 2 belt was still 
running-and became wedged against the No. 2 belt. At first it caused the 
., sloughings " and then, settling inw position it caused the 8 inche:; long 
hole, cutting the belt right through to the delivery drum. The edge in contact 
with the steel drum became worn away, or the stone may have shifted stightly, 
so that it remained in a position to cut nearly through the belt. 
VII.-THE FIRE : PLACE OF ORIGIN, EXTE SION AND CAUSE 
The fire at the No. 2 transfer point was first seen there about 3.45 a.m. on 
the 26th September, by Hird and, a few minutes later, by Morris, altendanb 
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at the Nos. 1 and J transfer pOintS, respectively. I n  its mitial stages the (ire 
was confined withm the chute aod centralizing hopper 
From his observations and deductions, a kno\\ ledge of the speed of tbe bell 
and of the ventilation and, for the later stages. of the speed a1 which Jos. Morris 
walked towards the o. 2 transfer POlO!, Mr. S. Jones. of the Safety i n  MIn� 
Research Estabhshment constructed the following t1me·tdble of the early stages 
of the fire. ThiS is necessanly conjectural but in my opinion gives a 
reasonable picture of what probably happened 111 these early stages :-
Time 
o 
o to 50 secs. 
50 secs. 
50 secs. to 
2! minute" 
2! minutes 
2! to 5i I11l1lulCS 
5! minutes 
10 mlllutes 
J 1 mmute" 
J I to I I !  I11lnutC\ 
I I !  minute, 
I I I to 23� min utes 
23t minutes 
23i '0 27 rrunu'e, 
27 minutes 
27 to 29 mlllute'\ • 
2! nllnU1C� 
I I ! minute, 
2 1 t  mlllule, 
27 minutc\ 
Beglllllll1g of groove passes No, � dcliHry roUcT. 
Groove belt passes over 0. 2 delivery roller. 
Groo\e belling tcars through. 
5! I Ilches strip accumulates In chute (620 feet). 
5� inches strip jams and the belt lears across. ( N .B.-Thl' 
,'\ a likely lime for friction at the gear-head to starl.) 
Jagged·edge material accumulates i n  chute. 
Belt tcars out to the edge. 
Beglllning of groo\'e passe:.. Ju�. Morris (tllis IS not a 
thing he would notice as cOl1\cyor ha, been running 
grooved aU Ius ,hif,). 
Trading end passes J . M .  
SIgnals to stop : conveyor �\\ itched on , slows down 
and stops. ( .B -That with the braklllgeffect of jammed 
belt in chute, the conveyor would stop quickly.) 
Conveyor stops. J .M. starts walklllg at two mil� per 
hour. 
J . M .  walks 700 }ards, and meets !'l11oke. 
J . M .  meets smoke (this smoke left the gear-head two 
minutes earlier, i.e. al 2 1 !  minutes). 
J . M. walks 250 yards i n  the smoke and then sees fire, 
J .M.  sees fire. 
J . M .  walks 150 yards 10 fire. 
!Jell jams 1 
t omeyor stoP�}J 
Smoke seen } 
FITe seen 
9 minutes for friction. 
1 0  mlllute� for ,mouldeTlng. 
5� minutc\ for burntng up. 
',B The laller times (smouldering and burning up) depend on 
Jos. Morri�' walking speed. 
The first account of the extension of the fire wa, Ihat given about 5 n.m. by 
J .  W .  Turner who reported that, when making his way outbye to safety, he 
opened the door of the air-crossing above the main bclt·conveyor road in 59's 
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ngl,t-side return airway, 115 }'ard� IObye No. 2 transfer point. and saw flame. 
Later. at 7.50 a.m., when rescue men examined this air-crossing, the fire had 
tben extended as far inbye as could be seen. After that, an iltlempt was made 
by rescue teams 10 determine Ihe inbye extension of the fire by inspection 
through various silts between the return and the Intake. The farthest 11 1  bye 
slit examined \\a<; at the bottom of the ElrnlOn Drifts. Here the team reported 
that they encountered dense smoke and heat and that the roof i n  the slit near 
the intake was breaking up due to high temperature. There was, therefore, 
no accurate information of the extension of the fire before the district was 
sealed off. \Vhen the area was reopened i t  was found lhal lhc fire had travelled 
mbye for a distance of 610 yards from the point of origin and that the burnt 
end of the top bell was just beyond the inbye end of an extensive fall of roof. 
I am satisfied that the fire would have continued to extend had not the di�tricl 
been sealed off when 1 1  was. 
The fire was undoubtedly extended by the burning of the rubber-conveyor 
belt along the roadway. Whilst the presence of some wooden supports in 
the vicinity of the No. 2 transfer point, and of wooden lagging used behind the 
steel girders and steel arches along the roadway, contributed to the size and 
Intensity of fire. I do not think they helped In any way to extend it. Indeed, 
by burning a\\a)' and thereby releasing falls of roof, the wood lagging may 
well have assisted In retarding the rate of extension of the fire due to the effecl 
of the falls i n  reducing the quantity of air circulating over the fire. On the 
other hand, the dangerous condition of the roadway thus brought about was 
a material factor in preventing fire-fighters from reaching the advancing fire­
front. 
From the outset, the fire was thought to have been started either through 
it defect in the electrical or mechanical equipment or by friction. A thorough 
examination of the electrical equipment showed that the design, installation 
and maintenance were all of a high order and it disclosed no defecl other 
than damage caused as a result of the fire. or was there anything to suggest 
that an electrical fault had suddenly developed. ElectTlcny can therefore be 
ruled out. All the mechanical plant at the scene of the fire was first exalntned 
10 the pit and then later dismantled and taken to the surface for closer 
examination. Detailed inspection of the No. 2 belt-head dnve, No. 2 belt­
delivery pulley, No. I bell-return pulley and all associated rollers showed no 
evidence of any of these having been the source of tbe fire. The bearings of 
the driving drums, the head pulley and return pulley were well greased and 
did not even disclose signs of excessive heat. Indeed, the drums were free to 
turn although they had been standing in the sealed area for six months. The 
smaller rollers sho\\ed signs of damage by the fire but nothing to in�icate 
that tbey were the cause of the healing which started the fire. I am sallsfied, 
therefore, that a mechanical defect in the machinery was not the source of 
ignition of the fire. 
L t  now seemed that the most probable source of ignition ,.,.as heat generated 
by friction within the chute or centralizing hopper at the o. 2 transfer point. 
and in"'cstigation was made to see how this friction could h<lvc ariscn. 
As already stated. when the No. 2 transfer point was very carefully examllled. 
it was found that, despite the intense conflagration, some torn conveyor belting 
still remained and was tightly wedged between the edge of the chute plate and 
the delivery drum of No. 2 conveyor. Although a very small pari of this 
�edged belting was III contact with the metal of the drum, mo�t of it \\as 
wedged against the belting which still conformed to the curvature of the drum. 
Consideration of all the circumstances suggested that frictionaL heating might 
ha\e arisen in various ways as follows :-
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I .  When the torn belting from No. 2 conveyor was passing forward down 
the chute plate, it might not have been carried away by the still running No. 1 
conveyor but held fast in the centralizing tunnel. Thus frictional heating 
between the moving o. I belt and stationary torn belt from No. 2 conveyor 
M!cmed a possibility. Experirnenrs simulating these conditions were carned 
out on the surface by the staff of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment 
with the co·operation of all paIlies, but tbey failed to gel ignition from this 
source. 
2. There might have been frictional heating by belt slip at No. 2 deliver) 
drum. The No. 2 belt delivery drum was a driven roller depending on contact 
between the belt and drum for its rotation. Since the bearings of the drum 
proved to be in order after the fire, there was no reason for thin ling that thiS 
drum did not continue to rotate throughout the period while No. 2 bell was 
moving. Moreover, the drum was free from any marks of scoring. There 
IS, therefore, no evidence to support belt-slip as the cause. 
3.  There might well have been frictional healing between torn belt jammed 
between the edge of the chute plate and No. 2 delivery drum. With a stnp of 
torn belt jammed in such a position, and No. 2 delivery drum still rotatlOg, 
�ufficient heat might be generated to raise the temperature of both drum and 
torn belting to the ignition temperature of the torn belting. Experiments 
carried out on the same gear-head at the surface of CresweLl Colliery proved 
that this was possible, but the time taken to obtain ignition was much longer 
than the time withjn which the ignition underground must have occurred . 
I think, therefore, this cause can be ruled out. 
4. Finally, there rem.tlned frictional heating bet\\ecn the moving No. 2 
belt and Jammed pieces of tOrD belting at the top edge of the chute plate which 
had been bent downwards. Detailed examination of the chute and torn belttng 
showed that some pieces of belt had been jammed tightly against the o. ::! 
belt on the head puUey and that considerable wearing had talen place. The 
pressure had been such as to cause slight erosion of the moving belt, indicatmg 
that there had been heavy friction. Again, using the actual driving gear and 
head pulley. tests were made on the surface with a stationary belt preSSing 
against the moving belt. Smoke was quickly visible and, m at least one test, 
smouldering occurred in I minute 55 seconds and fire I minute later-a total 
time of just under 3 minutes. The results of a number of tests showed that 
sufficient heat was generated during periods of time varying from 2 to 9 minutes 
to cause smouldering, whtle the periods between smouldering and fire varied 
from 2 to 20 minutes. These times fit in with the time which, it was estimated. 
would elapse from the moment the torn strip of belt became wedged in the 
chute until the fire was disco\'ered. 
Referring to these experiments, Mr. S. lanes of the Fire Research Section 
of the Safety in Mine'ii Research Establishment, when examined by Mr. \V. B. 
Brown, said in eVidence at the Inquiry : 
.. \Ve found fires started in two places. The sample itself, which \\as 
wedged to the lap of the chute plate, sometimes took fire ; even more 
often the abraded conveyor belt rubbed off the conveyor belting, which 
fell down 1 0  between the chute plate and the deli\-'ery roller on No. I belt. 
The abraded material was smouldering and took fire after i t  had fallen 
on to what was o. I belt." 
In other words, this series of experiments, carried oul With the equipment 
from the No. 2 transfer point, under conditions of pressure comparable with 
those likely to prevail in the chute at the No. 2 transfer point down the pit, 
showed that fires could readily occur by the heat generated by the friction of 
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lorn belting pres::'lIlg ag.uns1 the moving bell on the delivery roller. The fires 
started at two places. (i) in tbe sample of (Om belting itself, and (ii) in the small 
portions of abraded belting which fell  on to the mo\'ing bell below. In one. 
third of the experiments the sample of torn belting caught fire and, In three. 
quarters of the experiments. the abraded material caught fire. 1n the latter 
case there is no doubt that the fire could be carried along the moving No. I 
bel.t until it  came into contact with the torn bell piled up 10 the centralizing 
umt. 
As a result of these experiments, I have DO heSitation in coming to the 
conclusion that the fire underground was staned by frictional heating of torn 
belting jammed between the top of the sloping chute plate and the moving 
No. 2 belt as it passed round the delivery roller at the top of the chule at the 
No. 2 transfer point. 
I n  order lO get some measure of tbe speed with which a fire In a chute filled 
\\nh torn strips of the type of conveyor belling used at CresweJl would build 
up, additional experiments were carried out in the underground gallery at the 
Buxton Station of tbe Safety in Mines Research Establishment. In this gallery, 
which is an arched roadway, 8 feet \\ideand 8 feet high, it \10 as possible to control 
the ventilation, see the fire develop, get some idea of its intensity and some 
notion of the density of the fumes given off. For the purposes of the experiment. 
a two-thirds scale model of tbe Creswell chute was made at the colliery and 
installed in the gallery. It  was then fiJled with a proportionate amount of torn 
belting of similar age and condition to that actually u:,ed in the pit A fire 
was then staned by igniting two ounces of abraded rubber from a piece of 
belting. I n  describing the results Mr. Jones said in c\"idence :_ 
•. With ignition at the top of the sloping chute plate, that is III the 
position where the sample itself would have fired, the flames spread 
downwards to the bottom of the chute plate and fired No. I belt In less 
than 8+ minutes after the fire was started. Ignited at the bottom of the 
sloping chute plate, the flame spread upwards in about five minutes, up 
to the top of the chute plate, then to No. 2 delivery roller, so the difference 
between ignition at the top and ignition at the botlorn or the chute plate 
was no more than about 3! minutes." 
Speaking of the intensity of the fire in the e expenmenb, Mr. Jones had 
this to say :-
.. . . .  I can assure you that is, in a very short time, a very intense fire. 
That is, about five minutes from the stage where you can say ' well, the 
fire is going well and it is not Ijkely to go out: within five minutes you 
have the sides of the chute red hot and you have names coming out of the 
mOUlh 12 feet long. . . .  After another four minutes-that is to say a 
total of only 12 minutes right from the very beginning wc had difficulty, 
because the concrete roof of the roadway in which we were experimenting 
was starting to disintegrate ; quite a lot of the concrete was begmning 
to chip off due 10 the heat, sounding like a machine-gun going off. and 
we had to put out tbe fire." 
1t is perhaps of interest to record that, despite the intensity of this expen­
mental fire in an underground roadway. it was in fact put out fairly quickly by 
the application of a good supply of water under high pressure. Here is what 
Mr. Jones had to say in evidence about it  :-
.. For this purpose we used a 60 h.p. trailer pump, which will deliver 
500 gallons a minute at 100 lb. pressure. I do not know the precise amount 
of watcr we were actually using, but we were using that pump which 
delivers 500 gallons a minute, 100 lb. prcssure to a f inch nozzle. I 
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should perhaps say we were not attempting to make an experiment at the 
putting out of this fire. That was not our intention. \Ve were, I know, 
using a lot of water, a lot more water than most people could have i n  their 
pits. \Ve were using water i n  the quantity thal the surface fire brigades 
use it .  \Ve had v.'ater coming out from the nozzle with such force that 
it tool two or three men to hold the nozzle slIlI, because of the pressure 
of the force of the water. It was indeed a lot of water, and the fire was 
put out, of course, quite quickly .. ' 
\Vith regard to the density of the fumes given 00' by the fire during the 
experiments, Mr. Jones described them as " e:-.tremely dense " but, when 
questioned by Mr. �liron, he was unable to give any information about their 
lethal propcTlies as tests had not been carried out during the Cour3C of the 
experiments to determine their composition. 
Since it seems highly probable that between 20 and 30 minutes elap!)ed 
from the time the torn belting staTled to accumulcuc in the chute until the 
fire was actually seen, it may seem strange that the attendant stationed near 
thc No. 2 transfer point did not see what was happening and tale effective 
action in good time to pre\ent danger from arismg. Hird was questioned 
at some length on this matter. 
To begin wllh, there was some doubt about Hird's actual duties. He "as 
49 years of age, possessed a deputy's certificate and was i n  receipt of compen­
sation for injuries he had previously sustained to hiS nose, ribs and back. I n  
evidence, he said these injuries affected his strength and his walking. At the 
time of the fire he considered his duties to be, not that of attendant at No. 2 
transfer point, but of motor attendant at o. 2 belt, which was controlled 
from !)wJtches adjacent to the telephone situated near the entrance of 59's 
loader gate about 70 yards out bye from the No. 2 transfer point. No. 59') 
loader belt did not run al all during that shift. Hlrd \\as examined b) 
Mr. Brown about his dutlcs. 
Q. What did you do with your time during this shift ? 
A. Just operatll1g No. 2. 
Q. StoPPlflg the belt when someone gave a signal. answenng telephone 
calls and speaJ...ing to the pit-bottom operator as you thought occasion 
arose ? 
A .  During those gaps J was nOt answering the telephone because it never 
rang. I t  never rang until about half-pasHhree \\ hen they told me 
about going to meet Jos. Morrb and about thc torn belling. 
Q. Are you QUllC satisfied there has been no misunderMandll1g between 
you and the official who mentioned that you were to std} beside 
the 'phone ? Do you think he really meant that you should spend 
the Whole of the shjft beside the telephone and not e'vcn walk a distance 
of 68 yards down to the transfer point to sce whether things were 
right or wrong '! 
A. I had alway!) had IIlstruclions from Mr. Godfrey to slay by my 'phone 
unless told to go away or i f  he or Fred Kuk sent me on a n  errand. 
but I had to be told to go av"ay from that 'phone. Mr. Godfre} 
has ah\3)S Impressed on me that the 'phone was my vital post. 
Whatever Godfrey's IIlstructions to Hird may have been, it was clear that 
Ihe Manager did not agree with this description of Hird's duties and considered 
that he should have been spending part if  not most of his time at the No. 2 
transfer point. Had I l ird done so the torn belting might have been detected 
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in time and the fire prevented. Bc that as It may, when Iflrd did discover 
the fire, his physical condition seems to have prevented bim from taking any 
active steps to deal with it. He was examined by Mr. Brown on this point. 
Q. 1 want you to think �eriously of what I am just gOing to say to you 
Bill. If you had applied that extinguisher before Jas. Morris had 
arrived, was there a sporting chance Ihat you could have quenched 
that fire ? 
A. 1 could not have got up there in the state that 1 am in ; in fact, I 
cannot carry an extinguisher, not (0 be doing justice to myself. 
Q. You mean to lift it bodily ? 
A .  To carry il bodily. 
At first sight It would appear that only active persons tralDed in fire·fightmg 
should be employed at conveyor transfer points and that it was wrong to employ 
at such places anyone suffering from the kind of physical disability which 
afflicted Hird. \Vhen questioned on this matter by Mr. Brown, the Manager 
had this to say :-
.. WeU, there are two snags there, and I speak from the Manager's 
point of view. Because of my trunk scheme, I have been rather curtailed 
for light dULY jobs, and from humanitarian principles I have always used 
every transrer point for compensation men and light·dulY men of all 
descriptions. It IS practically the only way in which I can give these 
men employment. It has never been our practice to use for fire drills 
and fire·fighting teams men who are partly incap�lble, phYSically incapable. 
It has always been wrong in our opinion. These men should be physically 
incapable or doing fire· fighting and drills on a big scale. Therefore ir 
we are gomg to consider this in the light of possible fires at transrer points 
r am arraid J am going to be cut out from using partly Incapable men on 
these jobs, if you and others consider tbat all transrer·point men should 
be trained in fire drills. They may be trained in the method of doing 
fire drills, but it has been a bit difficult before from that aspect. We 
are prepared to give all transfer· point men some traming in fire driU, 
but not to be always in a fire-fighting team, If that is the pomt, I would 
say yes. I would prefer now that every man should have some drill." 
In this matter onc cannot but feci a great deal or sympathy with the view 
expressed by Mr. I nverarity. At a well-designed. installed and maintamed 
transfer point OD a well - run conveyor system-such as was the case at 
Creswell-there is very little physical work for a transfer point attendant to 
do, and such a job would seem suitable ror the employment or compensation 
or light·duty men. But whatcver the type of person employed, I agree with 
Mr. I nverarity that transfer-point men should be given some training in 
fire-fighting and that every man should have some drill, and T recommend 
accordingly. 
YIIJ.-\\ ITHDRAWAL OF WOR.KME FROM THE I NBYE 
SIDE OF THE FIRE 
(0) Warning Arrangemenb 
When a dangerous occurrence, such as a I1re, is known to have arisen in 
a mine, the speed and urgency with which men will start to withdraw from any 
pans of the workings which may be endangered will depend very largely uJ)<'n 
the action taken by officials or men on the spot who are aware of the occur· 
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rence. Action all their part will. in turn) be determlllcd by ( I )  their knowledge 
of the situation, nature and extent of the dangerous occurrence and its probable 
effects on the safety of men ; (2) a proper assessment of the extent to which 
men's li\'es arc endangered : (3) the effectiveness of the arrangements by which 
warnings can be sent to the men concerned ; and (4) the use made of these 
arrangements. 
In any warning system In a ITIme, telephones play an important part. Three 
telephone messages concerning the happenings at the No. 2 transfer point 
were sent by Hird to Kirk i n  the pit·bottom telephone exchange between 
3.40 and 3.45 a.m. The first was to ask for fitters to attend 10 the damaged 
belt, tbe second gave warning that a fire had started and asked for a fire party 
to be sent Ill, and the third was a request for the electric power to be cut off 
at the pit boltom. Kirk attended to tbese requests and on each occasion had 
to leave his switchboard to do so. \Vhen the power was cut off, Kirk had to 
work in his exchange by the light of his Hame·safety lamp. The fact that the 
power was cut oft brought J . Rodda, overman in the North-West District, 
to the telephone to ask what was wrong. Kirk told him there was a fire at 
No. 2 transfer point and asked him to come as quickly as possible. Rodda 
then told Kirk to inform the Manager and Undermanager. Kirk also received 
a call from G. Cooper, deputy for 68's face in the South-V/est OistlicI, asking 
why power was off, and was told tbat it was because there was a fire at No. 2 
transfer point. Kirk then telephoned to the surface to be put through to the 
Undermanager and the Manager at their homes and informed them of the 
fire, but he was unable at this time to gi\'e them any information about its 
extent. This was about 3.55 a.m. After that Kirk tried 10 contact Godfrey, 
overman in the South-West District, but on ringing the telephones at 64's, 
68's and 74's, he railed to get a reply at that time. Shortly afterwards Kirk. 
got a call from T. Severn at 74's telephone and told him to find Godfrey who 
was somewhere in tbe district. To quote Kirk's own words from the notes of 
evidence, he said to Severn : .. \Vhatever you do, send scouts out to find lum 
and tell him there is a fire at 59's transfer point and also contact the deputies 
and tell the deputies if you see them." It was not until about 4.20 to 4.30 a.m. 
that Godfrey spoke to Kirk. What passed between them is best told by 
quoting from the notes of evidence when Kirk was examined by Mr. W. B. 
Brown. 
Q. And you passed on the message to hIm that there was fire at No. 2 
transfer point '! 
A .  Yes ; I passed on tbe message to Mr. Godfrey that there was fire 
at No. 2 transfer point. 
Q. Did he tell you he would arrange for a fire-fighting pany ? 
A .  No, Sir, he just said on the 'phone, " Whatever has happened. 
Fred ? "  I told him there was a terrible fire at No. 2 transfer point 
and he just said, •• Good God " and dropped the receiver, and that 
was the 1:1.51 message [ had from Mr. Godfrey. 
Soon after Kirk had first spoken to the Manager and Undermanager at 
3.55 a.m. he rang through to Hird and asked him for more information about 
the fire and was told that " it was getting well bold of the timber." Kirk 
then conveyed this information to the Manager. Kirk was examined by 
Mr. Watson on this matter. 
Q. Wbat time would tbat be ? 
A .  Well. i t  was straigbt away after I got tbat call. Well. I expect the 
Manager was on the 'phone waiting for the reply. 
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Q. Did at any lime any of the officials on the surface, the Manager or 
the Underruanager. if the latter had spoken to you, ask you to 'phone 
inbye to gel the deputy to get the men out ? 
A. I cannot remember whether i t  was the Manager or the Undermaoager 
who mentioned to get the men to the return, Sir. 
Q. .. Gel the men straight la the return:' That would be shortly after 
4 o'clock ? 
A .  Yes, Sir, it would. 
Following on these replies, Mr. Watsoll then questioned Kirk about his 
later convers..'ltion with tbe overman, Godfrey. 
Q .  Did you convey to Mr. Godfrey the Manager's lnstrucl1ons ? 
A. No. Sir. He never stopped long enough. 
Q. SO you never got Ihe opportunity to convey to Mr. Godfrey the 
Manager's instructions that all the men must be got to the return 
side ? 
A. No, Sir, not to Mr. Godfrey. 
Q. Did you speak to anyone i n  the mine round about that time and 
give those instructions on behalf of the Manager ? 
of .  No, Sir. 
Kirk was further examined by Mr. Miron on this matter of telephone calls 
to the inbye faces i n  the Soutb·West District. 
Q. And then after you spoke to Mr. Godfrey did you speak to Mr. Hunt, 
Tom Hunt ? 
A. l heard Mr. Hunt, yes, but his was a very faiDt voice, and he had told 
me that his men were on their way, and J presumed it was his fire· 
fighting parLy, and down his receiver went. . . .  Thai was the only 
message, r presume, J got from Tom Hunt. 
Q. And that was some time after twenty·pasl to half·past four ? 
A .  Yes, Sir, it would be. 
Mr. Miron examined Kirk on the question of the accuracy of the various 
times he had given. 
Q. Really, to be quite fair, on the whole question of times at this interval, 
and after the ordeal through which you went, you could not be certain 
of any times ? 
A .  No, J am sorry J cannot. 
Q .  Or indeed about the sequence of all calls made, when you first spoke 
to the Manager or the Undermanager and Mr. Godfrey, you could 
not really be precise ? 
A .  No. The Undermanager, when he came down, asked me to try and 
check the times of calls, but there were that many calls, it was 
impossible to keep the conversation going and take the times of all 
calls. 
Kirk was also asked by Mr. Watson if he had received calls from anyone 
i(the return airway. 
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Q. Did YOll recci\c any telephone calls of any son during the course of 
the morning after the fire in connection with the running of the paddy 
mail ? 
A. I got a caU from out of the return, but [ do not kno\\ what vOice It 
was, calling for the paddy. [ thought aU power was off. 
Q.  Those who were tclephoning were anxious to  gel out of the scene of 
the fire ? 
A .  Yes, Sir. It must ha\c been someone asking for the paddy. 
Q. Was it a strong voice-clear ? 
A.  Well. I should say reasonably. Just a reasonable voice, SIr. 
Q. You have j ust told Mr. Brown your voice was affected by thl!:> fire .� 
A.  Yes, Sir, it was up to the last q uaner·of·an-hour I was in-quarter­
past-five. 
Q. \Vas this voice something similar '! 
A. Yes. Sir. 
About 5 a.m. the atmospheric condllions in the telephone exchange were 
becomjng intolerable. On this matter, Kirk was examined by Mr.  Brown. 
Q. Were you later affected by the fumes ? 
A .  Yes, Sir. 
Q. Do you remember how you were affected ? 
A. Yes. I t  seemed to catch my voice first. I t  was taking m)' VOICC. 
I had a bottle of water, and practically after every telephone message 
1 had to have Cl little sip of water. I had only a drop left, and I had 
(0 make i t  last Ollt. and then i t  caught me further In my body. 
Q. Your legs ? 
A .  Yes. 
Q. Your brealhing : 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you then sent to the surface for more water ? 
A .  Yes. 
Q. And who took your place ? 
A .  Charlie Howe, the day telephone operator and office attendant ; 
he came down about twenty�five past five, and we had a five minutes' 
com ersation. I passed various messages on to him, and he sajd, 
.. Ilavc you any water, Fred ? "  I said " No, Chariie, 1 have nOI 
got a drop left." 
Q. SO that right up to 5.20 (I.m. you could breathe in the return and 
carry on a converso-l ion ? 
A .  Yes. I was carrying on a conversation. 
Q. Under difficulty ? 
A .  Yes. in the last quarter-hour i t  was under difficull1es. 
Q. And did yOll final1y pass out, and were you put on it stretcher ? 
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A. I felt myself going after 1 had been up 10 the surface. I fetched three 
bottles of water from the Balhs, and I got down the pit again with 
much trouble with the banksman who did not want me to come down. 
and I went back into the office. As 1 was proceeding through the 
doors I met two men carrying Chariie out. He had been overcome. 
They were carrying him into Ihe main o. I bottom. I proceeded 
past them and into the office to try to carry on with the 'phone messages 
as there was no one i n  the office, and then two or three minutt:s after­
wards I collapsed and got down on my k nees, and I was making my 
way out of the office when I met Herbert Ro.ss who was coming back 
there after taking Charlie out through the doors. I said, ., Herbert, 
it's gOL mc," He said, .. Fred, get down on the floor and get through 
the doors into No. I ,  if possible." 
Q. And before you lert the telephone exchange after returning from the 
surface did anyone come in for the purpose of arranging the plugs 
so that the exchange in the return was no longer necessary ? 
A .  No, Sir ; not then. 
The siting of the pit-bottom telephone exchange should be i n  the main 
mtake so as to minimize the risk of its being fouled, as happened in this case. 
At some pits, i t  might well be housed on the surface. The manning of the 
exchange during a disaster, when instant aClion and the keeping of a full log 
are necessary, should be planned and arranged before-hand as part of the 
general plan of action in an emergency. 
From this record of telephone communications there is clear eVidence that 
knowledge that a fire had occurred at No. 2 transfer point was known by 
G.  Cooper, deputy in 68's district. about 4 a.m., about 1 5  minutes after lhe 
fire had been reported, and that a few minutes later, T. Severn also knew and 
had been told to contact the deputies and let them know about i t .  Whether 
the overman, Godfrey, knew of the fire before he reached the telephone betwecn 
4.20 a.m. and 4.30 a.m. is not known. but it seems f�lirly certain tbat by thi::; 
time the ventilating current passing the i nbye telephones would be polluted to a 
visible degree with smoke and fumes from the fire. 
I n  the early messages senl inbye it does appear that no emphasis was laid on 
the need for all men in the district to leave their place of work immediately and 
hurry out by the return with all possible speed. This lack of emphasis no doubt 
arose from lack of precise knowledge of the nature and extent of the fire and [h� 
knowledge that good fire-fighting facilities were believed to exist. But there i .. 
evidence that even when smoke was plainly visible, some of the men did not 
hurry. This was to some extent emphasized by the evidence of F. \V. Tomlinson. 
who said he .. walked slowly down 68's gate." It  is significant that the only 
coal-face men who were able to reach safety were from 65's panel. This wa., 
largely due to the deputy, W. Morris, who sensed the seriouli n:Hure of the fire 
and, after collecting his men together, stressed upon them the need for speed 
and led them to 59's left airway. I n  this way he brought 30 men to safety. 
Face rippers from 74's and erectors from 64's escaped because they had finished 
their work and were already on the way out when the fire was in its early stages. 
J t  was suggested that some of the workmen \vere slow to realize the need 
for urgency because of the high standard SC[ for the installation and maintenance 
of the conveyors, for the safety of the mine in general and the apparent excellence 
of the fire-fighting arrangements. These factors may have had some influence, 
but I think the lack of eflcctive warning was a more important factor. Men wen: 
known to have spent time in dressing and in hiding tools and !'OIllC of the 
victims even carried tools out as far as the tOp of the Elmton Fault. J lad there 
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been a feeling or sen::,e of urgency, especially In  the early stages, the death roll 
might well have been shorter. There is  reason to believe also that several men 
waited for the .• Paddy " to come inbye in the hope of getting a ride before 
starting off out bye, and it is known that several got inw the •. Paddy " when it 
arrived inbye, for bodies were found in the train. On the other hand, some of the 
men must have appreciated the urgency, because their bodies were found on the 
out bye side of the top of the Elmton Drift, although they were known to have 
been working on the most distant faces. Some of the victims had travelled 
more than a mile, and there is little doubt that they had been in  a smoke-laden 
atmosphere for most of the time. 
Whilst there is no doubt that early warning of the existence of a fue reached 
mb}e districts by telephone, there was no evidence to suggest that tbis warnjng 
reached many, if indeed any, of the men on the inbye faces. This was due in 
some measure to the distance of the inbye telephones from the working faces, 
the nearest being 350 yards from 65's face and the farthest, 430 yards, in 74's 
district. l nbye telephones should be sited as near as is practicable to the working 
faces. 
Nor was there any eVIdence to suggest that a message urging the immediate 
wlIhdrawal of the men was ever received. The position seems to be that before 
anyone on the out bye side of the fire realized its serious nature and the danger 
threatening the men inbye, the dense fumes had already passed the inbye 
telephones and their attendants were 011 their way out bye. Because of these 
circumstances, it is highly probable tbat the men on the working faces first 
became aware of the fire when the fumes actually reached them and would 
come out on their own initiative and not be fully aware of the need for extreme 
urgency. 
By tbe very nature of mining, men are not all concentrated together as in a 
factory and there must inevitably be a delay in getting a warning to them. 
When a source of danger arises, such as a fire, which is likely to endanger 
persons employed in other parts of a mine, it would clearly be an advantage to 
mc1ude in the code of signals for lransm.ission by the signalUng and telephone 
systems of the mine, a distincti\'e signal to indicate that a state of emergcncy 
existed which required the immediate withdrawal of the men, and I recommend 
accordingly. 
It would usually be necessary in such circumstances to ensurc that the men 
made contact with the ofricial, if any, in charge of the district at the time, or 
with the person in charge of the nearest telephone, so that they could receive 
IIlstructions how to proceed. For this purpose the alarm signal would have to 
be followed with the mll1imull1 of delay by a telephonic message to the district 
to indicate the subsequent procedure best calculated to ensure safety. To this 
end, as already indicated, it would be an advantage if the inbye telephones were 
sited as near to the working faces as was reasonably practicable. 
'If, i n  addition, an alarm signal could be given of such a nature that it could 
be heard by as many as possible of the persons threatcned by the danger, it would 
be an added advantage. I was pleased to hear at the Inquiry that a firm of 
telephone manufacturers had co-operated with officials of the National Coal 
Board in the East Midlands Division in an effort to devise a method of trans­
mitting through the telephone system a distinctive warrung by means of a 
KJaxon horn. If an inbye telephone was reasonably near to the working face, 
the piercing Dote of the horn would probably be heard by someone on the face. 
It  was the intention that the Klaxon would be sounded intermittcntly until the 
telepbone was answered and information given as to the nature of the emergency 
and the procedure to be adopted. A fire-alarm of this sort would be an advan­
tage and I commend the problem of devising such an alarm to research workers 
llnd electrical engineers. 
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(b) Ways alld Means DJ Escape 
The following table gives parliculars In respect of the men employed (Plan 
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The only way of escape for all these men was by tbe return airway. 
In any assessment of the chances of escape, the speed at which the 
fumes and noxious gases from the fire travelled inbye must be considered 
(Plan No. 2). It  cannot be assumed, of course, that the air current after 
passing the fire contained lethal amounts of noxious gases immediately, nor can 
it be said with accuracy when the concentration of carbon monoxide 
or other poisonous gases i n  the air current reached sufficient proportions to 
cause serious distress or death to persons breathing it. The estimated time taken 
by the smoke·laden atmosphere to reach certain points inbye may help to explain 
why more men from the 65's face than from the other faces escaped. The 
estimated time-based on tbe air velocity-for fumes to reach 64's junction wa� 
7t minutes, and to reach 64's face, 27 ffilnutes. By then the fumes had reached 
74's face, had passed round 65's face and had reached the return airway. From 
this it  will be seen that when the smoke and fumes on 64's face indicated that the 
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position was senous, part of the return was already fouled. It would take about 
34 minutes for the fumes to travel round to 59's left return gate but i t  is known 
that W. Morris brought 30 men to that point at 4.55 a. I11., sOlne 75 minutes 
after the fire started. By that time the conccntration of carbon monoxide was 
reaching such a proportion that men were collapsing, as happened i n  the C3"e 
of R. Walker. 
I t  was most unfortunate thai, at the tl lne of the fire and just when the inb)c 
men had great need to get out bye in a hurry, the man·riding arrangements III 
the main return were not running as usual because work was being done on the 
roadway and track. Some days before the occurrence of the fire. the run of 
the " Paddy " had been extcnded inbye to 74's cross·headlllg-a total run of 
nearly 2� miles. To ensure smoother running of the haulage, this necessitated an 
Improvement i n  the grading of tbe roadway and track near the foot of the 
Elmton Drift. \Vork to this end was in progress at the actual time of tbe fire, 
and to assiq thc workmen in the handling of tubs at the job. a pony was 
employed. In order that the H Paddy " could be used to tJle best advantage 
whilst the work \vas in progress, one train was detached from the rope and left 
at the " meetings " so that the other train could run freely between the pit 
bottom and the out bye end of the repair job at the foot of the Elmton Drift. 
It  was the intention, of course, that at the cnd of the shift the track would 
be left in running order. the second train would be reattached to the rope, and 
the " Paddy " would run as usual for the transport of the men at tbe cbange 
of shifts. Thus it was that, when the fire occurred, the " Paddy " was not in its 
usual running order and there was, i n  addition, a pony employed i n  the roadway. 
And when the inbye men reached the " Paddy " terminus in the return before 
the end of the shift they had no knowledge of the arrangements that had been 
made to run the " Paddy " under the exceptional conditions prevailing at that 
time. What actually happened in the return airway when the inbye men. whose 
bodies were found there, were on their way out bye can only bc a matter of 
conjecturc. 
The sequence of events 111 relation to the movement of the " Paddy " after 
the outbreal-.. of the fire was known seems fo be as follo\\s. The onc train 
attached to the rope was tra\'elling oulbye with face rippers frol11 74's panel 
when the power was switched off about 3.45 a.m. \Vhen power was restored, 
the train was brought out bye to the terminus near the pit bottom. The train 
remained at the outbye end until the overman, Rodda, and his fue-fighting 
team went inbye with it to 59's left gate. where it remained for several minutes 
until, i n  response to the usual signal, it was brought out bye again. \Vhen i t  did 
reach the terminus the train was found to be empty. The haulage engineman. 
F W. Hicl-..s, then received a telephone call from 74's asking for the " Paddy " 
to be sent in, bm by this time, smoke and fumes had already almost reached the 
engine·house at the outbye cnd of the return. The engineman started to run 
the train inbye when he received a signal of " I . , followed by " 10," i ndicating 
that a pony or ponies were travelling and he stopped the haulage. The train 
was then .a short distance outbyc from the stable slit. During this stop, a worl-..­
man i n  the main return, Leslie Hancock. spealJng from the telephone at th!! 
foot of the Elmton Drift, called Hicks and asked for the .• P.lddy." According 
to the Undermanager, Pay ton, who overheard the conversation while listening 
on another telephone, Hancock said ' . .  This is Leslie Hancock, this is Lcslie 
Hancock ; where is the train, where is the train. We are all about done here." 
That was the last time a voice was heard from the return airway. At least ten 
ll'tinutes later, although there is considerable doubt about Ihis interval. the 
engineman received a signal of " 1 0  
,
. and .• 2," and he started the train on its 
way inbye. I t  had reached the " meetings " when the fixed electric lights i n  the 
enginehouse failed. As the electric signalling system was supplied with power 
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from [he lightmg circuit through a transformer, this meant that the signalling 
system was now also Ollt of action. A few minutes later, the power came on 
again and the engineman once more started the haulage but the " Paddy " had 
only travelled inbye about 70 yards when the lighting and signalling systems 
again failed. When power was restored again, the engineman received a number 
of conflicting signals and, acting correctly, he did not start up the haulage but. 
knowing there was a telephone at the < ,  meetings," he tried (0 get in touch by 
telephone with anyone who may have been in that vicinity at the time, but 
without success. 
Ultimately. a clear signal was received from somewhere inbye and the engioc­
man started the train once morc on its inbye journey. When the train had 
reached the lOp of the Elrnton Fault. the telephone rang and the engine01an 
stopped the haulage to answer. It was a call from the Undermanager, who 
wanted 10 know where the train was and where it was going. The engineman 
gave him the information and started the haulage again, which took the train 
to the temporary inbye terminus near the foot of the ElmlOn Drift. Thereafter, 
no further signals were received from inbye nor was there any further telephone 
message : nor was it ever ascertained who gave the various signals for no one 
came out alive. And yet, when the train arrived at the {erlllinl1s some men must 
still have been alive. for they had boarded the train. 
By this time. the atmosphere in the enginehouse wa� so badly fouled with 
smoke and fumes that the engineman was panly overcome and was compelled 
to leave his post. I--Ie went about 30 yards towards a slit connecting the orth­
\Vest District intake and return where he was revived by a leakage of fresh air. 
He was still within hearing distance of both the telephone and sigl1al bells, but 
he heard no further signal. Had the enginehouse been ventilated by intake air, 
It would have been an advantage. 
Whilst i t  may have been true that, in the telephone messages sel1t il1bye to 
warn the men of their danger. there was a certain lack of emphasis on the great 
need for speed in clearing out of the district, I do 110t think there cao be any 
doubt that once the men reached the main-return airway they would be only 
too well aware of their danger and would be most anxious to get out bye with 
aU possible speed. That the .; Paddy " could run only under the restrictions 
imposed by the repair work i n  progress at the time was bad enough, but tbat 
its movements were hampered by the presence of a pony or ponies and by the 
intermittent failures of the electric power and signalling systems-by which not 
less than 30 valuable minutes were lost-was a double misfortune. The reason 
for these failures of the electric power was never satisfactonly explalllcd. Had 
the .. Paddy " been able to run inbye without interrupllon when the first 
telephone message from 74's was received about 4.30 a.m. it was just possible 
that more men would have escaped. Wherever practicable. repairs which wouLd 
Interfere with the running of man-riding trains i n  an emergency should not be 
undertaken when a full shift of men is at work inbye. 
11 was difficult to avoid the feeling that, i n  the early stages of the fire. more 
thought and action were given to the fighting of the fire than to means of 
ensuring the escape of the men on the inbye side of the fire by way of the return 
airway. I n  a time of serious emergency when everyone is working under great 
stress, when conditions are wholly abnormal, and when most of the personnel 
engaged are not fully acquainted with all the local details, it is hardly right to 
criticize the actions of those engaged in dealing with the emergency or to blame 
in any way those who, without doubt, had no other thought i n  their minds 
than to give of their best. Nor do [ intend to do so. Nevertheless. I feel i t  my 
duty to point out that when an emergency arises which endangers life and limb, 
the first duty is to see that everything possible is done to save life. This does 
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not mean that nothing should be done to deal with the actual danger Itself 
but it  does mean that it  should not take priority over life saving. Whilst the 
evidence showed that early warning of the fire was telephoned inbye and that 
the manager and undermanager had been assured that the men had been warned 
and were on their way out bye. there was no conclusive evidence to show that 
the inbye men had. in fact, received warning to withdraw without delay and 
there was nothing to suggest that a high official had been specially designated to 
see that every possible step was taken from the outset to facilitate their escape. 
(c) Provision o/ Two {make Airways 
When a serious conveyor fire occurs in any mme in the intake alf\vay of a 
ventilating district which has only one intake, then the means of escape for 
the men on the inbye side of the fire may well be cut off, since the return airway 
(or airways) will in time become fouled with the noxious products of combustion 
from the fire. The time taken to foul the return airways will depend very largely 
on the extent of the fire, the distances involved and the velocity of the air current. 
Since there was only one main·intake and one main·return airway in the South· 
West District at Creswell, and since Ihe large fire occurred in the intake on the 
outbye side of the main production faces, the men at work on these faces on the 
night-shift of the 25th/26th September, 1 950, had only one road-the main­
return airway-along which they could make an attempt to escape. Moreover. 
the iobye production faces i n  the South-West required a large quantity of air 
for efficient ventilation and this quantity had to travel in beyond the fire along 
onc road until it  reached the first split at 64's face. Although the speed of the 
fan had been slightly reduced on the manager's instructions, nevertheless. the 
velocity of the air was still relatively high along this section of the intake and 
would, therefore, not only help to fan the fire but would carry the products of 
combustion rapidly inbye. The velocity of air in the single main·return airway 
for most if its length was also relatively high and, in fact, was not less than 
500 feet per minute-a speed much in excees of that at which a man can walk 
on the level. But the men who were attempting to escape on th.is fateful night 
had to travel under very difficult conditions because the smoke of the fire 
reduced visibility, caused their eyes to smart and their throats to be irritated, 
while they had also to travel at one part for 250 yards up a gradient of 1 i n  6-
a pan so aptly named by Mr. Watson • .• the hill of death." 1 l  is obvious, 
therefore, that unless the inbye men received a.n urgent warning to clear out of 
the district very soon after the start of the fire, they stood little chance of reaching 
safelY by walking the long distance to 59's left·return airway, because the fumes, 
travelling at a much higher speed than the men, would overtake them. This. in 
some measure, accounts for the heavy death roll. 
There is little doubt that if a second intake had been available in the South­
West District, the danger to the inbye men would have been reduced and their 
chances of escape greatly increased. \Vith a second intake, the velocity of the 
air on the eomeyor road would ha\'C been reduced and so the fire would nOl 
have been fanned so quickly; the speed of travel of the fumes inbye would have 
been reduced, thus allowing more time to send a warning to the inbye men : 
and the provision of connections between {he two intakes would have given the 
fire-fighters an opportunity of getting ahead of the fire and taking action to 
prevent its extension. To provide two main·intake airways to every main 
ventila.ting district of a seam would mean no more than compliance with !-he 
intention, if not the letter, of Section 42 of the Coal Mines Act, 1 9 1 1 ,  a Section 
which was based on recommendations made following an Inquiry into the 
disaster at Welliogton Pit, Whitehaven, i n  1 9 1 0, when 136 lives were lost due 
10 an outbreak or fire in a timbered main-intake airway. 
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With present methods of working and transport, the application of the double 
intake in many pits would require a good deal of thought In the planning and 
lay-out of the method of worldog and ventilation. Nevertheless, I am satisfied 
that for aU major ventilating districts in  a mine, the principle is right, that 
mining engineers can surmount the difficulties in its application and that the 
provision of two main intakes should be a statutory requirement for such 
districts in  new mines and in new districts of existing mines, and [ recommend 
accordingly_ 
1 am. pleased to report that, soon after the occurrence of the Crc�\'vell fire, 
the National Coal Board gave consideration to the question of the provision of 
two intake airways in all coal mines under their control, accepted the above 
recommendation and issued a directive to all managements to that effect on 
9th July, 1 9 5 1 .  A copy of this directive is given in Appendix I l l .  
rx.-SUPERVlSION OF TRUNK CONVEYOR SYSTE�l 
AND OF TRANSFER POINTS 
Considerable time was devoted at the Inquiry to discusslllg the important 
question of the supervision necessary to ensure safety in the trunk-conveyor 
system. Broadly. the question largely n::solved itself into onc of whether, in 
conjunction with the provision of safety devices of proved worth, it was sufficient 
to have a patrolling system under which a competent person or persons-the 
number depending upon the size of the installation-would keep the whole 
length of the belts and transfer points under observation during each working 
shift. or whether there should be. in addition to the patrolling system, a man in 
constant attendance at each transfer point. 
The expert witnesses examined on this matter agreed that it W.1S desirable to 
have a patrolling system and la instal at suitable places, such as transfer points 
and driving heads. effective automatic safety devices and conveyor control gear. 
If  these measures were adopted then they did not think it would be necessary 
10 require attendants to be stationed at all transfer points. 
Whilst it may not be possible to provide automatic proteclion against all 
possible sources of danger that may arise in a chute at a conveyor transfer 
point, there are precautions which can be taken to guard against likely causes of 
danger such as the piling up of material in  the chute or any condition which 
might give rise to overloading. With reference to Ihese causes of danger. 
Mr. A. E. Crook, H.M. Principal I nspector of Mechanical Engineering in 
Mines. i n  evidence. suggested that ., piling " could be prevented by either : 
(a) fitting in the chute a paddle connected to the electrical circuit of the motor, 
so that in  the event of a pile�up, the paddle would move and break the circuit 
and then stop the motor ; or (b) sequence of control of the conveyors to 
ensure that a loaded belt does not deliver on to a standing belt. Mr. Crook 
also suggested that (i) the chute might be so designed and arranged as to prevent 
or minimize the risk of any material being trapped at tbe top of the chute or, 
(ii) in the event of material being trapped there. i t  would not cause firc. The 
first, be suggested. might be achieved by setting the chute \\cll below the hori� 
zontal centre-line of the delivery pulley. But this method, as hc pointed out. has 
the disadvantage that, by so doing, the free�fall of material would be increased 
and the dust problem thus aggravated. For the second. he proposed the use of 
the " hinged chute "-the Crossland device-in which a hinged plate is fitted to 
the top end of the chute and held in position by springs, so arranged that under 
abnormal load the springs extend and cut off the power driving the belt motor. 
To prevent ordinary overloading of belts, suitable overload protection should be 
fitted to the driving motor. 
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Most of these devices are, of course, well known, but they are not applied as 
frequently as they might be. As Mr. Miron pointed out, tbe Crossland device 
was, i n  fact, adopted at many CoUjeries in (he East Midland Division and its 
use was extending. It has now been installed at Creswell. The adoption of 
automatic safety devices will depend upon the circumstances but most of them 
have 3n application in nearly all large trunk-belt installations. I commend 
them to colliery managements. 
Mr. Crook, when questioned by Mr. Miron, had this to say : 
Q. 
A .  
I n  other words-may J put it tllis way-if there i s  adequate supervision 
and sufficient electrical and mechanical safeguard over the conveyors at 
the transfer point, you would not recommend a static transfer point 
attendant ? 
I think I indicated in my suggestions that onc could have the conveyor 
stopped by either automatic means or manual means, and then I went 
on to indicate about the transfer point attendant. 
Q. Yes, let us be quile clear ; if we have what you consider lo be adequate 
mechanical or automatic means for the stopping of the conveyor 
you would not then seek to have one man permanently located at the 
transfer point ? 
A .  J would not, with the pro\iso that the complementary point which 
I made was adopted, namely. that there was a competent person or 
persons in charge of the trunk conveyor system at any mjne. 
Q. Yes, there would be at all times, i n  addition to that automatic control. 
adequate supervision over the whole trunk conveying system ? 
A .  Yes, tbat i s  my point. 
Mr. Watson questioned Mr. Widdas, H.M. Senior District I nspector of 
Mines, at some length on the matter, as follows : 
Q. . . . .  Onc answer was not clear, and I would bke to get il  perfectly 
clear frol11 you. Are you or are you not in favour of attendants being 
constantly at all transfer points ? 
A .  On the broad question of that r am afraid my reply has to be .. No'" 
but I would say that if there is no safety device added in that chute. 
then it is .. Yes'" 
Q. Let us examine this, because it is going la be an important part of thi::. 
Inquiry. What safety device have you In mind ? 
A .  The type of arrangement like the Crossland. 
Q. Is it inraLlible ? 
• 
A.  Not entirely, but i t  would have prevented this type of fire. 
Q. That IS a point upon which I could not express an opinion. Is thIS 
equipment likely to go wrong ? 
A. All equipment from time to time can go wrong. That is as far as r 
can go. 
Q. Therefore it would be necessary to have some attendants at transfer 
points ? 
A .  1 stilt cannot subscribe to that, provided approved, or i f  you Like 
tested over a period of lime, apparatus is provided. 
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Q. Did you hear Mr. Joncs' evidence yesterday ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you note the time Jag between the jammmg and the smouldertng '! 
...4 . Very short, I agree. 
Q. Did you note that he �aid Ihe sCientist was alarmed ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you note that he said he ceased to be a sCientist and became an 
ordinary bloke putting out the fire ? 
A .  Yes. 
Q. Have we any guarantee that the introduction of thiS Crossland deVice 
will prevent fires i n  the future ? 
• .-4 .  Wc have to accept safety devices as such. and 3\ long as they work 
they will prevent fires. 
Q. Would you agree that someone should be at the transfer P0ll11 10 
see that the safcty device is working. 
A .  No. 
Q. You would not agree that there should be attendants at the transfer 
points ? 
A .  I f  safety devices are provided and we "'now that they will work. We 
regard the safety device as almost infallible, but i( never is absolutely 
infallible, and I would say it is not necessary to ha\e a transfer attendant 
always there. 
Q. Can you tell us what you would have in their place ') 
A. Men patrolling. 
Q. How far '  
A .  It would have to be very limited. 
Q. As to what distance ? 
A .  1 would say probably to No. 2 belt. That would be I ,OSO yards, and 
I think two patrol men could do that. 
Q. That would mean that when they leave the tran ... fcr point they would 
travel 1 ,000 yards and bac k ?  
A. They would. (Note: It was later brought oul that Mr. Wlddas meant 
that the total distance travelled would be 1,080 yards altogether, 
i.e. 540 yards there and back.) 
Q. Have you any idea how long that would take them 10 do ? 
A .  Fineen minutes, I would say. 
Q. Did not this accident happen in less than fifteen minutes ? 
A .  It did, but timing for the actual conflagration was definitely over 
1 5  minutes. The fire was there within the fifteen, J agree. 
Q. Therefore i t  is important, i f  the automatic device fails, to have someone 
who can see the lire ? 
A. Yes, but I think we are working 011 the very odd chance. We have 
electrical safety devices which do from lime to time fail unfortunately. 
and yet we accept them. 
. 
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Q. You are a man employed by the Ministry to safeguard the workmen, 
and I am asking you a frank question and you do not agree that there 
should be a workman in constant attendance at a transfer point if the 
other device is  installed. 
A.  If devices are installed which we will accept as safety devices. just as 
we accept other safety devices in other methods of mining. 
The trunk belt conveying system at Cres\velJ was on a big scale and great 
care had been taken to instal and maintain the conveyors and especiaUy to 
minimize the risk of fire. The structure was built up clear of the floor and 
rested upon concrete blocks ; the conveyors were in good alignment and all 
belt joints were vulcanized ; coal dust was cleaned up regularly ; the conveyor 
pans were liberally treated with limestone dust and at 5-yard intervals along the 
roadway there was a 56 lb. bag of stone dust ; and conveyor motor attendants 
were employed in preference to automatic sequence control, whilst in the case 
of No. 2 transfer point a cleaner was normally employed in addition to the 
attendant in control at 59's junction. Unfortunately, this cleaner was absent 
on the sbift during which the fire occurred and his place had not been filled. 
So well had the plant been installed and maintained that it had run without a 
serious mishap since its installation at Easter 1 948 until the time of the fire--­
a period of 2! years. 
A patrol system had nOl been established but the belts would come under 
the observation of the conveyor motor attendants stationed at or near the 
transfer points. The installation as a whole would be secn by tbe officials and 
deputies as they tra\oelled the roadway. In addition, an experienced belt­
maintenance fitter was employed to repair damaged belts. But whatever the 
nature of the supervision of the trunk-conveyor system at CresweU, this accident 
did not arise from a failure to detect a damaged belt. The belt-maintenance 
man had been called on the afternoon-shift to examine the known damage to 
the belt. He considered it could run during the shift under supervision and it 
did so. But he also considered it should be repaired at the end of tbe shift and, 
indeed, had received instructions from the afternoon-shift overman to work 
overtime in order to do so. The damage to tbe belt was therefore known to tbe 
overman in charge of the afternoon-shift, who said he reported it to the overman 
(now deceased) on the night-shift ; but neither of them seemed to think tbe 
damage serious enough to warrant a personal inspection. Most unfortunately, 
as it turned out, the night-overman seems to have countermanded the instruction 
for the repair of the belt at the change of shifts. It  may be that he thought that 
since the damaged belt had run without mishap during the afternoon coating 
shift, it could also run for the lighter duty required of it in the night-shift and 
could then be repaired before the start of the day-shift, and that, in any case, 
the worst that could possibly happen \\ould be that tbe belt would fail aod that 
transport would stop. I feel sure it  De\er occurred to anyone that the damaged 
belt was likely to give rise to a fire. 1evertheless. it does seem wrong that a belt 
which was allowed to rUIl on the afternoon-shift only under tbe supervision of 
the belt-maintenance man, was allowed to run without similar supervision on 
the night-shift. There is no doubt that those who actually saw the condition of 
the belt at the end of the afternoon-shift considered it should have been repaired 
before the night-shift started. But despite any mistakes or errors of judgment 
that may have been made, had there been a full-time attendant actually stationed 
at the No. 2 transfer point or had the chute at this transfer point been fitted with 
a safety device of the Crossland type, it is  almost certain that the disaster would 
have been prevented. 
This fire directs attention to the need for greater care in future in tbe super­




them is reponed. When damage is reported, the belt should be examined as 
soon as possible by a competent official who should ha\c authority to stop the 
belt and have it  repaired without delay. The responsibility for such decisions 
should Test with an official and not on the shoulders of workmen. but a belt 
attendant should have authority to SlOp a belt, if he thinks the damage warrants 
it, until i t  has been inspected by the competent official, and I recommend 
accordingly. 
On the question of supervision, after careful consideration of the matter, 
I have come to the conclusion that on all trunk-bell installations there should 
be a regular patrol system while the belts are working and for at least two hours 
after stopping, and either (a) automatic safety control devices fitted at all 
transfer points and driving heads, or (b) at transfer points where no such 
devices are fitted, a full-time attendant, and I recommend accordingly. With a 
patrol system in operation, it will be necessary to provide effective means of 
stopping a conveyor from any point along the roadway. 
X.-CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following the failure to effect timely repairs to the badly damaged conveyor 
belt which resulted in torn strips of belting collecting in the No. 2 transfer 
chute, the disaster was due to four successive causes : ( I) a rapidly starting and 
growing fire spreading in the main-intake airway ; (2) the failure of the fire­
fighting arrangements ; (3) some delay 10 warning the men inbye : and (4) the 
main return was the only means of escape for the men on the inbye side of the 
fire. Unless fires on conveyor roads could be wholly prevented-and it is not 
possible to be sure of this-then there is potential hazard frol11 them and it is 
necessary to consider how best this hazard can be mitigated by action under 
these four heads. There is little doubt that present practice in many mines 
leaves much to be desired and that it can and should be improved. 
For the consideration of colliery managements and others in their efforts to 
prevent fires and the resulting hazards on trunk-conveyor installations where 
inflammable belts are used, I append a list of the more important matters to 
which I should like to direct attention. 
I .  Prevenlion oJ COllveyor Fires 
(a) The roadway should be straight, weU graded and large enough to allow 
ample clearance above and below as well as on both sides of the conveyor. 
Ideally, the largest lump of mineral conveyed should be able lo fall sufficiently 
clear to avoid rubbing against tbe belt. 
(b) All parts of the roadway where there are transfer points or driving units 
should be of flre�proof construction, extending for 5 yards on either side of 
such places. Non-inflammable material should be used for pillars supporting 
tbe conveyor structure, and the roadway, in general, should be kept free from 
combustible material and especially from accumulations of coal dust. 
(c) As soon as they are proven in practice and are commercially available, 
only belts which are non-inflammable or are highly resistant to fire should be 
used. 
(d) Automatic safety devices to prevent overloading, belt-slip, over-heating, 
and piling-up at transfer points and to detect damaged belts. should be developed 
and used. 
(e) Attendants should be stationed at all transfer points not safeguarded 
under (d). 
(/) Competent persons, specially trained for the work, should be appointed 
to patrol trunk-conveyor systems when in operation and for two hours after 
stopping. 
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log) Effective means or stopping a conveyor rrom any point along the roadway 
should be provided. 
Ch) Substantial damage to conveyor belts should be reported rorthwith and 
should be examined by a competent official who should have authority to stop 
the conveyor and repair the damage. 
2. Fighting of COIII'e),or Fires 
(a) The fire-fighting organization at every colliery should be thoroughly 
checked and improvements effected where necess.lfY, and the need ror speed i n  
action should be emphasized. In particular, special attention should be paid to 
the training (\\ hich should include fire-drills) and the calibre or the fire-fighting 
personnel. 
(b) Underground fire stations should be situated on the intake side or 
vulnerable points and when the material or equipment at these points is moved, 
the fire station should be moved to meet the new conditions. 
\c) Persons stationed at transfer points or near fire stations should be trained 
i n  the use of the portable fire-fighting appliances provided and should be 
physically capable of using them in an emergency. 
(d) Fire-fighting water mains should be instatled throughout and the water 
should be supplied rrom a source which feeds into them directly and contin­
uously. The fire mains should be capable of providing sufficient water at adequate 
pressure at any transfer point, and tests should be made at suitable intervals to 
check the quantity and pressure of water available. The pressure of the water 
supply at any transfer point should be measured at the beginning of every 
working shift and the result should be recorded. A conveyor should not run i f  
the supply of water is inadequate. 
J. iVarning to Men ["bye 
(a) Where the lives of men are endangered by a fire, a responsible official 
�hould be charged with the sole duty or seeing that the threatened men are 
warned without delay and that everything possible is done to racilitate their 
escape. 
(b) There should be included in the code of signals used on telephone systems 
a distinctive signal to indicate that a state of emergency ex.ists which requires 
the immediate withdrawal of the men. It would be an advantage i r  this alarm 
signal could be heard by as many as possible or the men threatened by the 
danger. 
(c) I nbye telephones should be sited as near as practicable to the working 
faces and should be so placed that there is always someone in their vicinity 
during working hours. 
(d) Underground telephone exchanges should be ventilated by intake air 
and arrangements should be made before-hand to have them specially manned 
in the event of an emergency. 
(e) Repairs which would interfere with the running or man-riding trains in 
an emergency should, as far as possible, be avoided when a full shift of men is  
at work inbye. 
4. Means of Escape 
ta) Wherever practicable. there should be two intake airways and these should 
be provided ror all major ventilating districts in all new mines or new develop­
ments in ex.isting mines. 




Cc) As soon as an emergency arises, man-riding and other traveUlOg facilities 
i n  escape roads should be cleared for action. This should be the responsibility 
of tbe official appointed under 3 (a) above. 
(d) \Vhere rope-haulage man-riding arrangements arc situated in return 
alrwaYSI arrangements should be made, where practicable, to ventilate the 
haulage engine-house by intake air. 
It is importanl lo realize that, in so far as action under (I )  lOT the pre\-cntion 
of fires is  concerned-even though it might not be fully elTective in all circum­
stances-there is much that could be done which would succeed in slowing 
down the initiation, growth and spread of a fire and which would so reduce the 
potential hazard to men inbye that loss of life would be unlikely. A h.igh degree 
of resistance to fire would gain very valuable time. 
There is, however, no short cut to success and what tbis disaster suggests is 
the urgent need for tightening up safeguards a.nd precautions against fires at 
all stages. An over-riding condition of success in dealing with fires is the high 
calibre, thorough organization and full training of the personnel, and 1 emphasize 
that in general before passing on to other matters. 
The Public Inquiry having been held up for more than a year by the sealing 
up of the fire, this Report is  unavoidably belated and 1 8  months have now 
passed since the disaster occurred in September, 1950. But these were not 
months of inaction. Immediately after the fire, action on a national basis to 
strengthen precautions against such fires was being planned and was started by 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power and the National Coal Board-plans and action 
i n  which I had my part as Chief Inspector of Mines until the end of July, 195 1 ,  
and in which, since then, I have continued to have my part as a Member of the 
National Coal Board. 
In these circumstances, most of the recommendations that I have made have 
already been put forward and considerable progress has been made in putting 
them into practice. The plans and action now in progress have my agreement 
and I can best therefore conclude this Report by giving a brief account of what 
that action has been and how it is  developing. 
At its meeting on 4th October, 1950, eight days after the disaster, the Safety 
in Mines Research (Advisory) Board-the body, comprised of representatives 
of all sides of the Industry and of scientific thought outside it, which advises 
lhe Minister of Fuel and Power on matters relating to re�earch on safety in 
coal mines-unanimously agreed the following resolution, drafted by its Chair_ 
man, Mr. E. G. Fudge, C.B., C.B.E., for submission by him to your predecessor : 
.. That this Board, having discussed the problem of fire hazards under­
ground in mines with particular reference 10 the Creswell Colliery Disaster 
and in the light of the knowledge and experience of its members, considers 
an extension of research into such hazards a matter of urgent necessity. It 
advises that this should take the fonn broadly of co-ordinated laboratory 
and field investigations undertaken jointly by the Ministry and the National 
Coal Board, and that the Ministry should enter into discussions accordingly 
with the interests concerned so that a concened plan of research may be 
put into effect as speedily as possible." 
Your predecessor at once accepted tbis resolution and directed that action 
should be taken accordingly without delay. This was done with the full co­
operation of the interested parties and a comprehensive research and investiga­
tion programme on fire hazards at mines was agreed. This programme is given 
in Appendix IV. 
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So far as the National Coal Board is concerned, in addition to welcoming the 
opportunity to participate i n  tbe work outlined i n  the above programme, 
instructions were immediately given by the Board that colliery managements 
must intensify uleir efforts with the minimum of delay to reduce the hazard from 
underground fires. The action taken by the Board is summarized in its Annual 
Report for 1950. as follows : 
., To reduce fire hazards underground, the Board tightened up precautions 
at every colliery, water supplies and fire-fighting equipment were checked 
and the Board issued fresh instructions about the training of fire-fighters. 
fire-proofing of transfer points, regular patrolling of c,:mveyor roads, the 
suppression of accumulated coal dust on conveyors, and the lay-out of 
telephones. Research into fire dangers, particularly those connected with 
the use of belt conveyors, was intensified. Various kinds of belling, includ­
ing non-rubber b�lling, were put through laboratory tests for inflammability, 
and experimcnts were made i n  fire-proofing the cotton-duck base, which 
was found to be the most inflammable part of the belting. Tests were made 
on oils and greases used for lubricating conveyor rollers and the use of 
preventive appliances on equipmenl. In consultation with the machinery 
manufacturers, the design and construction of underground machinery 
were reviewed from the point of view of fire risk." 
Action on these lines continued at the collieries during 1 95 1 ,  and is still 
proceeding. But much remains to be done. 
As regards action by the Ministry of Fuel and Power, a new Research Section 
for research on fire hazards at mines was established before the end of 1950, at 
the Buxton Station of the Safety in Mines Research Establishment. I t  was this 
Section, under the charge of Mr. S. Jones, which was responsible for carrying 
out so well the experiments-previously described in this Report-(a) on the 
surface at Creswell, to study lhe probable cause of the cut belt and the source 
of ignition of the fire, and (b) i n  the underground gaUcry at Buxton, to get some 
measure of the rate of development of the fire in the chutc. Among other 
researches undertaken to promote means of reducing the underground fue 
hazard, the Section has been very active i n  its investigation of the fire-retardant 
treatment of timber used for the support of mine roadways or for other purposes. 
and of the use of sprinkler systems or water barriers in suppressing or preventing 
the spread of conveyor fires. 
It  is also studying the effects of controlling the quantity and velocity of air 
upon the initial development and subsequent spread of a fire in an underground 
roadway. L wclcome this investigation because the subject is, potentially, of 
mueh importance in relation to underground roadway fires and because so 
little appears to be kno,""n about it.  The development of this work should include 
field work on a full scale at a suitable coUiery. 
Researches in accordance with the agreed programme are still conLinulDg 
at the laboratories of the Safety i n  Mines Research Establishment and at tbe 
Central Research Establishment of the National Coal Board. Valuable assistance 
has been given by the Fire Research Station of the Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research, where ., spread of flame " tests on conveyor belt samples 
were carried out, and useful information on heating detector dcvices was 
obtained froOl the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough. Because of 
the special requirements imposed by use in gassy mines. few of these devices 
now i n  use i n  other industries are suitable, without modification, for use under· 
ground in coal mines. 
H.M. Inspectors of Mines are closely associated with most of the work I 
have described and, in co·operation with the National Coal Board, the 
Research Organisations and some of the manufacturing industries, are using 
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their \\ide knowledge and experience in promotmg and faciiit.llmg progres., at 
the collieries and new technical developments. 
Research confirms that ( i)  the main risk of fire I n  the type of conveyor belung 
i n  ordinary use underground i n  mines lies in the cotton-duck foundation of the 
belt ; (ii) this risk can be reduced by fire-proofing the duck : and (ili) the plastic 
poly-"nyl-chloride ( 1'_ V.c.) if used inSlead of rubber for Ihe facing of Ihe belt 
greatly reduces the risk of fire from the duck. Conveyor installations usmg thiS 
highly fire-resistant type plastic belting have been on trial underground for 
more than a year \\Hh promising results, and encouragement I�  being given 
bi the National Coal Board [0 belt manufaclUrer� to expedite production of 
Ihis I) pe of belling. 
To prevent danger of fire ariSing from the heating of a conveyor dnving he..'1d. 
a fe" manufacturing firms and the Central Research Establio;;hment of the 
Natlonal Coal Board have designed thermostatic control dc\ ices which, when 
heated by radiation, cut off the current from the driving motor. Prototypes of 
these devices are being made for trials underground. Attention is also being 
given to the problem of reducing the risk of fire from the heatmg of an idler 
roller. 
From this brief account of the work that has been undertaken since the 
occurrence of the Creswell Fire, it will be seen that active steps h3\e been taJ..en 
at the collieries and at the research establishments to minimize the underground 
flre hazard a t  mines, and that the work is continuing. I am satisfied that these 
efforLs are well directed and have already resulted in a considerable raising of 
the standard of safety in relation to mine fires. 
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Appendix I .  
UST OF VICTIMS 
I .  BODIES RECOVERED ON 26TH SEPTEMBER, 1 950 
Christiall Names Surname Age Occupation 
I .  Leonard Bower 38 Shot Firer 
2. Harry Godfrey 5 1  Overman 
3. I-Iorace Attenborough 45 Packer 
4. Willlam Henry Bird 39 Ripper 
5. John Henry Bowden 29 Meco Moore Operator 
6. Ernest Briggs J3 Packer 
7. John William Brocklehurst 44 Packer 
8. Robcrt Brough 36 Cutlerman 
9. Alfred Edgar Bryan 56 Packer 
10. Herbert Stanley Buckle 48 Glimmer 
1 1 .  SaOl Cocking 42 Culterman 
12. Ernest Deakin 60 Gummer 
1 3. Ernest Dodd 37 Ripper 
14. lohn Dodd 45 Packer 
15.  Fred Doncaster 27 Conveyor Erector 
16. John Witliam Doxe} 45 Packer 
17.  Gcorge Ellis 51  Packer 
18.  Charles Foulkes 49 Cunemlan 
19. George William Gillert 38 Ripper 
20. Kenneth Amos Goucher 42 Conveyor Erector 
2 1 .  Peter W. Green 53 Packer 
22. e. Hemingray 2S Conveyor Erector 
23. Geeil HendJey 34 Cutterman 
24. Reginald C. Holmes 44 Cutterman 
25. Amold Hutton 48 Packer 
26. J. T. lackson 58 Gummer 
27. Robert lames 52 Packer 
28. Ernest Johnson 36 Packer 
29. E. Johnson 46 Packer 
30. Reginald Kirk 39 Ripper 
3 1 .  William Mellish 55 Steel Supervisor 
32. Edward Millward 44 Packer 
33. Ernest LcsUe Needham 44 Stone Contractor 
34. WiJliam Henry Orvice 49 Conveyor Erector 
35. Kenneth F. Robinson 25 Packer 
36. G. Sydney Rogers 44 Ripper 
37. Victor Rose 52 Cutlennan 
38. Lcslie Rutherford 25 Culterman 
39. Thomas J. Senior 42 Packer 
40. J. Sbaw 56 Ripper 
41.  Herbert Srupley 38 Cutterman 
42. Thomas Smith 51 Packer 
43. Thomas Traylor 43 Cuttennan 
44. Robert William Thomas Walker 38 Packer 
45. C. Ward 30 Packer 
46. Frederick \Vhitlam 52 Packer 
47. George Yearham 57 Face Timbemlan 
fn each case the cause of death was carbon monoxide poisoning. 
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2. llODleS RECOVERED ON THE 25TH MAR H, 195 1 
Christian Names Surname Agt, Occllpatio" 
48. Leslle fo.tafshaJl 42 Deputy 
49. Reginald Teasdale 46 Supports Economy 
50. Wllllam Adams 5 1  Packer 
5 1 .  Frcderick Barker 4 1  Ripper 
52. Lee John Buxton 59 Steel Supervisor 
53. Alien Davis 63 Stone Contractor 
54. Leslie Dodd 47 Ripper 
55, Thomas Henf) Evans 50 Packer 
56. Gardon Fox 62 Ripper 
57. Leslie Hancock 28 Packer 
58. lames Arthur Harrison 60 Cutterman 
59. Thomas Hart 39 Datal 
60. John Will iam Humphreys 50 Ripper 
6 1 .  A lbert Lewis 46 Packer 
62. Edward Limb 55 Datal 
63. John Henr) London 48 Ripper 
64. William lame" London 51 Packer 
65. Alberl Cecil Mallcllder 47 RJpper 
66. William Mellish 36 Datal 
67. Eric Parkin 36 Cutterman 
68. Robert I dris Price 34 Packer 
69. Arnold Lortin Robinson 29 Packer 
70. James Lewis SadJcr 41 Ripper 
71. Thomas Arthur Se\ern 46 Datal 
72. William Ernest Stonach 36 Ripper 
73. Joscph TayJor 42 Face Tlmbc:rman 
74. George Wass 37 Packer 
In each case the cause of death was carbon monoxide pOlsomng. 
3. BODIES RECOVERED ON THE 1 1TH AUGUST, 1951  
75. Thomas William 
76. Harry 
77. Georgc Charles 
78. McDara 
79. John Edward 























LIST OF WITNESSES 
I .  INQUIRY ON 1 7  18 .  1 9TH OCTOBER, 1 950 
Nall/e 
J .  Green, Thomas ArchlC 
2. Hunt, Thomas Arthur 
3. I nveranty. Gcorgc 
4. Leah, Leshe Rawson 
5. H indley, John Robcrt 
6. Sherrard, Uriah 
7. Martin, Joseph John 
8. Clifford, John 
9. Colhngham, John Henry 
10. Morris. Joshua 
1 1 . /-lird, William H lndley 
1 2. Noble. Joseph Spencer 
13 .  Ross, Herbert 
14. Kirk, Frederick 
1 5  H iCks, Frederick Waiter 
16. Pay ton, George Samuel Ward 
1 7 .  �'torris, William 
1 8 .  Cooper, George 
1 9. Tomiinson, Frederid.. Waiter 
20. Mason, James 
2 1 .  Turner, John Willi3m 
22. Henson, Alfred Hcrbert 
23. Brown, George Little 
24. Widdas, Waiter 






Belt Maintenance Man 
Pumper 
















Manager, Central Rescue Stations, East 
Midland Division. 
H .  M. Senior District inspector of Mines 
H.M. DI<;tnct Inspector of Mmes 
2. RESUMIoD I NQU I R\ -27,28T11 NOVEMBER, 1951 
I .  Green, Thomas Archic 
') Turner, John Wliham 
3. Belts, George \Vllllam 
4. Rodda, John Edward 
5. Thompson, Frcd 
6. Hind/ey. John Robert 
7. Rushton, George Wilfred 
8. Morris. Joshua 
9. Plaits, Ernest James 
10. Jones, Sydney 
1 1 ,  Crook, Albert Edward 






Belt Maintenance Man 
Mamtenance Fitter 
Belt Attendant 
H.M. Electrical Inspector of Mines 
Principal Scientific Officer, Safety Ifl Mines 
Research Establishment, Buxton 
H . M. Principal I nspector of Mechanical 
Engineering in Mines 




NATIONAL COAL 80ARD DIRECTIVE ON PROVISION OF 
TWO INTAKE AIRWAYS 
I .  The Board have decided as a maller of policy that the prOVISion of two mam­
mtake airways 3S requITed by Section 42 (I)  of the Coal Mmes Act, 1 9 1 1 (subJcct to 
the e ... emptJons and exceptions provided therem and in General Regulation 89 of 
10th July. 1 9 1 3,). shall be extended as follows 10 any seam newly opened, and In the 
further development of any seam already opened unless in the latter case the antIcipated 
length of life of that part of the mine or the number of men to be cmplo)ed does not 
Justify the provision of ">,0 malO-intake 31T\\ays. 
2. For each part of the mme ha\ ing a main transport system serving more than onc 
\cntilating district, two main trunk intake airways (which shall be of such siz.e and 
shall be mamtained In such conditions as to afford a ready means of Ingress and 
egress) shall be provided from the entrance 10 the seam (except within the distances 
from the shaft or outlet fixed in General Regulation 90 of the 10th July, 1 9 1 3,) to the 
point where the last split is taken to ventilate any district of the mine : 
Provided that ;-
(i) two malO trunk Intake airways as aforesaid sball not be reqUIred If the 
number of persons employed below ground on any one shift 10 that part of 
the mme does not eA-ceed 100 ; 
(ii) in the case of a seam entered by a cross·measure dnft from the surface or 
from the shaft bottom or from another seam, the " entrance ,- to the seam 
shall be the pomt where the cross·measure dnft strikes the seam ; 
(iil) two malO trunk mtake airways as aforesaid shall not be reqUIred in the case 
of dnvage through old \\orkmgs or goaf e;'(isting at the date of this dlrecti\e, 
3. I n  respect of each ventilating district where any working face IS more than 1 .000 
�ards from the main transport system, and where an mflammable belt comeyor 
exceeding 250 yards in length (other than a face comeyor) I., IOstnlled : the t\\O 
main·intake airways shall be extended to the workmg face : 
Provided that thiS reqUIrement shall not apply :-
(i) if the number of persons employed below ground in that district on any 
shift does not exceed 50 ; 
(ii) in the case of drivage through old workings or goaf c,\.i�lIng at the date of 
this directive. 
4. Where pari of the workings in a seam is connected 10 worklOgS in another palt 
of the sa.me seam by means of cross-measure drifts, owing to faults or other natural 
disturbances in the strata, the two intake airways need not be provided through or 
beyond the cross·measure dnfts if they are not Justified for the reasons gl'ven In 
paragraph I .  
5. This dircctl've shall take effect forthwith Ifl respect of newl}·opcned seams and on 
the 1st January, 1952, in respect of further development of any seam already opened. 
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Appendix rv 
PROGRAMME OF INVESTlGA no WORK ON FIRE HAZARDS AT MINLS 
SUHJECT 





B. Origi" alld 




This is of great importance 
in detcrmining where the 
hazards lie, so that pro­
jects can be precisely 
stated and priorities allo­
cated. 
I .  Sources of ignition­
fundamental studies. A 
tradnional S.M.R.E. 
field Work on the Igni-. 
tion of coal dust by hot 
surfaces has been sug-
gested. 
2. The detection of heat-
ings and a study of their 
development. 
3. Temperature of Ignition 
of different kinds of 
coal. 
4. Travel of fires. Involves 
comprehensive iO\esti-
gatlon under realistic 
conditions in an experi-
mental mine or gallery. 
5. Special fire hazards on 
operating diesel loco-
motives. 
I .  Warning !>ystems. In-
eludes warning person-
nel of an emergency and 
indicating what steps 
should be taken. 
2. Siting of telephones and 
exchanges. This would 
include a study of the 
adequacy of under-
g r o u n d  t e l e p h o n e  
systems. 
3. Patrolling. For example 
of conveyor belt instal-
lations. 
4. Development or new 
methods of U G. com-
munication. Orthodox 
radio systems unsatis· 
factory, but there " 
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c 
.9 -
" "  - � .� .;:: 
























I .  To operate warnmg de-. 
vices and fire-fightmg 
equipment such as 
sprinklers. 
2. hre and Heat detectors. 
Smoke. gas, heat and 
flame actuated. 
3. To operate plant. 
S .... ltching off the po .... er. 
controlling compressed 
air. etc. 
4 Sequence control of 
multIple conveyor 
systems. 
























E. Fire Fighfing I . Fire drills. Design of Jointly 
F. Rescue 
G. Fire Proofing 
drills and inStitutIon of by N.C.S. 
regular practices. and 
2. Use of present fire­
fighting equipment. 
3. Development of new 
equipment. 
4 .  Standardisation of 
equipment. 
5. Testing and maintenance 
of equipmenl. 
6. Extinguishing agentS : 























J .  Rescue apparatus. In­
cluding breathing appa­





2. Self-rescuers. For use 
by personnel olher than 
rescue men. . 
3. Rescue driJJs and 
metbods. 
J .  Conveyor belting. Use 
of neoprene. fire-proofed 
duck, etc. 
2 .  Timber. 
3. Lubricants. 




































6. P;1 lnts and \"arnlshcs. 
7. Standard tc!)lS for tire­
proofness. To aVOid a 
multlphcity of empirical 
tC!)b. 
8. NOXIOUS gases ansmg 














1 Usc of hoods. Advis- 1 
ahlll!) or othcrn lse, and 
de!:>lgn. 
2. COn\eyor rollers. For 
mstance, me: of self­
lubnC-1.tors. 
J. Rubber-lmed dmmg 
pulleys. 
4. Belt jomlmg and stltch-
109. Refers to the rela­
tne safety and mechani­
cal dTiclency of vulean­
I\lng \-ersus mctal joints 
.lOd �titchmg. 
5. Belt maintenancc 
gencr<l lly. 
6. c.:on\eyor chutes. 
7. AuxIliary dri\-mg bellS. 
8. Use of Open type con­
\- cyor structure. 
9. Width and speed of 
belt ... 
10. Means for pr\!\ entmg 
o\crloadm8 of belts. 
I .  IntJ.ke airways on trunk 
conveyor systems. The 
que<;tion of number and 
connectlom bet"een 
mtakes. 
2. Location of conveyors 
.... hethcr mtake or return. 
3.  Inst.1ll1ng of con\-eyors. 
4. Use of altunatl\-c haul­
,lgC methods. 
5. Water supply. quantity. 
qu.lllty. pressure. 
) 
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